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ENFORCEMENT OF FORUM-SELECTION 
CLAUSES IN FEDERAL COURT  
AFTER ATLANTIC MARINE  
Matthew J. Sorensen* 
 
Forum-selection clauses are important agreements that limit exposure to 
risk of litigation in an undesired locale.  The enforcement of forum-
selection clauses in the U.S. federal court system was not always certain, 
but today, such agreements are broadly considered enforceable.  Courts, 
however, are split as to whether such clauses are governed by state or 
federal law and as to the proper procedural mechanism for enforcement.  
Recently, in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court, the 
U.S. Supreme Court made strides toward resolving these disagreements 
among lower courts. 
This Note explores the history of enforcement of forum-selection clauses 
in federal court and articulates the legal complexities that remain in the 
wake of Atlantic Marine.  It argues that Atlantic Marine implicitly resolved 
the choice-of-law split in favor of applying state substantive law to 
determine a forum clause’s validity and federal procedural law to 
determine its enforceability.  To effectuate this implicit resolution, this Note 
proposes that courts engage in a two-step analysis in evaluating motions to 
enforce forum-selection clauses and that litigants bring such motions under 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 12(c), or 56. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A large internet service provider makes the search records of more than 
650,000 customers available for public download.1  These records are 
subsequently distributed widely throughout the internet.2  They reveal 
highly sensitive personal information, including the customers’ struggles 
with sexuality, alcohol addiction, mental illness, physical abuse, domestic 
violence, incest, adultery, and rape.3  The records also “contain[] addresses, 
phone numbers, credit card numbers, social security numbers, passwords 
and other personal information.”4  In response to this information breach, 
two customers, suing as “Doe” plaintiffs to protect their anonymity, bring a 
class action against the internet service provider in California federal court 
seeking relief for all customers under a federal privacy statute and various 
California consumer protection laws.5  The defendant, seeking to enforce a 
forum-selection clause found in its standard customer agreement, brings a 
motion to dismiss for improper venue pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(3).6  If the motion is successful, the plaintiffs will be 
compelled to bring their lawsuit in Virginia state court “where a class action 
remedy would be unavailable to them”7 and could be forced to bring their 
claims pursuant to Virginia law, which “provides significantly less 
consumer protection to its citizens than California law.”8 
This Note assesses the substantive law governing the validity and 
enforceability of forum-selection clauses9 and procedural mechanisms for 
enforcing such clauses in federal court.  The U.S. Supreme Court, in 
Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court,10 recently resolved 
a circuit split on the use of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404 and 1406, relating to 
“Change of Venue” and “Cure or waiver of defects” in venue, respectively, 
and Rule 12(b)(3), relating to the enforcement of forum-selection clauses.  
 
 1. Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 2. Id. at 1079. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 1079–80. 
 6. Id. at 1080 (noting that the defendant “moved to dismiss the action for improper 
venue pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3)” on the basis of the parties’ 
forum selection clause). 
 7. Id. at 1079; see also id. at 1081–82 (“[T]he forum selection clause at issue here—
designating the courts of Virginia—means the state courts of Virginia only . . . .”). 
 8. Id. at 1084 n.13; see also id. at 1083 n.12 (“California courts have ‘extolled’ ‘the 
right to seek class action relief in consumer cases.’  In Virginia state court, in contrast, class 
action relief for consumer claims is unavailable.” (quoting Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior 
Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 712 (Ct. App. 2001))). 
 9. A forum-selection clause is a “contractual provision in which the parties [to the 
contract] establish the place . . . for specified litigation between them.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 726 (9th ed. 2009).  The case law and academic literature use a number of 
different terms to describe the same basic contractual provisions, and this Note uses these 
terms interchangeably. See Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal 
Courts After Carnival Cruise:  A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 
56 n.1 (1992) (referring to “‘forum selection clause’ or ‘forum clause’ and ‘forum selection 
agreement’ or ‘forum agreement’ interchangeably”). 
 10. No. 12-929, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Dec. 3, 2013). 
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Missing from the narrow debate before the Court in Atlantic Marine, 
however, was discussion of a broader circuit split concerning the validity 
and enforcement of forum-selection clauses.11 
Prior to Atlantic Marine, there was no meaningful consensus among the 
circuits concerning the standard for determining the validity and 
enforceability of forum-selection clauses or the proper procedural 
mechanisms for enforcement.12  While Atlantic Marine has provided some 
clarification, the remaining multifaceted circuit splits implicate 
longstanding federalism concerns,13 threaten to confuse litigators and 
courts, and jeopardize parties’ substantial litigation and contractual rights in 
federal court.14 
Part I of this Note begins with an overview of the importance of forum-
selection clauses to contracting parties.  These provisions assist parties in 
allocating the risk of litigating in a given jurisdiction before contractual 
disputes arise and thus increase predictability and efficient resolution of 
such disputes.15  The overview also explores the difference between so-
called “mandatory” and “permissive” forum-selection clauses,16 how they 
interact with choice-of-law agreements, and how federal courts interpret the 
scope and meaning of such provisions.17  Part I includes a discussion of the 
Supreme Court’s forum-selection clause jurisprudence.  This discussion 
begins with the Court’s historic refusal to give effect to forum-selection 
clauses, traces how that refusal was grounded in the “ouster doctrine,”18 and 
examines its subsequent abandonment by the Supreme Court in The Bremen 
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.19  Part I.B discusses the Court’s holdings in The 
Bremen, Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,20 and Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute,21 which led to widespread disagreements among lower 
 
 11. See infra Part II.A. 
 12. See infra Part I.B.4.a. 
 13. See generally Borchers, supra note 9 (discussing federal versus state choice of law 
issues, federal subject matter jurisdiction, and transfer issues); Kelly Amanda Blair, Note, A 
Judicial Solution to the Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement Circuit Split:  Giving Erie a 
Second Chance, 46 GA. L. REV. 799 (2012) (discussing Erie issues raised by forum-selection 
clauses); Robert A. de By, Note, Forum Selection Clauses:  Substantive or Procedural for 
Erie Purposes, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1068 (1989) (same); Ryan T. Holt, Note, A Uniform 
System for the Enforcement of Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 1913 (2009) (discussing choice-of-law barriers and procedural barriers to enforcement 
of forum-selection clauses); Young Lee, Note, Forum Selection Clauses:  Problems of 
Enforcement in Diversity Cases and State Courts, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 663 (1997) 
(same). 
 14. See Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law:  
Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 296 
(1988). 
 15. Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway:  The Law and Economics of Choice of 
Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 700–01 (1992). 
 16. See Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 383, 386–87 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 17. See infra Part I.A. 
 18. Borchers, supra note 9, at 60. 
 19. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 20. 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
 21. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
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federal courts concerning the enforcement of forum-selection clauses.22  It 
concludes with a discussion of Atlantic Marine,23 which resolved some—
but far from all—of these disagreements and altered the standard of 
enforcement of forum clauses through the federal common law24 doctrine 
of forum non conveniens and § 1404(a).25 
Part II explains the disagreements that remain among lower courts 
concerning the enforcement of forum-selection clauses.  First, it discusses 
the split among federal courts concerning the application of federal or state 
law to determine the validity and enforceability of forum-selection 
clauses.26  Part II concludes by discussing the viability of enforcing forum-
selection clauses via Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 12(c), and 
5627 and explores the implications of this approach alongside Atlantic 
Marine’s newly articulated § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens standard.28 
Part III argues that Atlantic Marine breathed new life into arguments that 
the validity of forum-selection clauses should be determined according to 
state law, even if enforceability is a question of federal law.  It proposes 
that courts and litigants adopt a two-step method in assessing whether a 
given forum-selection clause should be enforced.29 
This argument is grounded in the Stewart Court’s interpretation of the 
venue transfer statute, § 1404(a), as implicating only the enforceability of 
forum-selection clauses and not their validity.30  Part III then argues that the 
Supreme Court implicitly adopted this interpretation in Atlantic Marine 
when it held that “venue in all civil actions” is determined exclusively by 
statute and that § 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3) are applicable only when venue 
is statutorily infirm.31 
 
 22. See Maxwell J. Wright, Note, Enforcing Forum-Selection Clauses:  An Examination 
of the Current Disarray of Federal Forum-Selection Clause Jurisprudence and a Proposal 
for Judicial Reform, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1625, 1636–43 (2011). 
 23. No. 12-929 (U.S. Dec. 3, 2013). 
 24. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253–54 (1981) (discussing the 
federal “common-law doctrine” of forum non conveniens). 
 25. See infra Part I.B.4.b. 
 26. See infra Part II.A. 
 27. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 28. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 29. See infra Part III.A. 
 30. See infra Part III.A.1.  As Justice Antonin Scalia observed in his Stewart dissent:  
“Section 1404(a) is simply a venue provision that nowhere mentions contracts or 
agreements, much less that the validity of certain contracts or agreements will be matters of 
federal law.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 31. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 12-929, slip op. at 4–8 (U.S. 
Dec. 3, 2013).  Proper venue is established according to the dictates of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) 
and an agreement of the parties cannot fairly be characterized as rendering statutory venue 
“improper.” See Licensed Practical Nurses, Technicians & Health Care Workers of N.Y., 
Inc. v. Ulysses Cruises, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 393, 404–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“‘Venue,’ in 
turn, is defined by statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which sets forth where venue may properly be 
laid.  The determination of the appropriate venue under Section 1391 revolves around 
[various factors listed in that statute, which do not include forum-selection clauses.] . . .  The 
fact that the parties contractually agreed to litigate disputes in another forum is not a 
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Next, Part III argues that enforcing forum-selection clauses through the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens could raise concerns grounded in the Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins32 doctrine.  This is because the forum non 
conveniens inquiry under federal law allows for a balancing of various 
interests in making the enforcement-dismissal determination,33 while state 
law may presume validity and enforceability of forum clauses absent a 
showing of extraordinary circumstances such as fraud, adhesion, or 
violation of public policy.34  Thus, the application of forum non conveniens 
doctrine could violate the twin aims of Erie by encouraging forum shopping 
and leading to possible inequitable administration of state contract law.35 
Part III concludes by arguing that the Supreme Court gave too little 
consideration in Atlantic Marine to the method of raising a forum-selection 
clause as an affirmative defense and enforcing it by moving either to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for judgment on the 
pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), or for summary judgment pursuant to 
Rule 56.36  In evaluating a hypothetical defendant’s forum-clause 
affirmative defense, a federal court sitting in diversity would look to the 
substantive state law governing contract disputes, including the state law 
that governs the validity of forum-selection clauses, and enforce the clause 
via dismissal provided that a defendant has met its procedural burden under 
the applicable rule of civil procedure.37  For example, where a plaintiff has 
filed a lawsuit in violation of a forum-selection clause, the defendant files a 
motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff can “raise no genuine 
 
question of venue, but one of contract.” (quoting Nat’l Micrographics Sys., Inc. v. Canon 
U.S.A., Inc., 825 F. Supp. 671, 678–79 (D.N.J. 1993))). 
 32. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 33. See MBI Grp., Inc. v. Credit Foncier Du Cameroun, 616 F.3d 568, 571 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (“A court may . . . dismiss a suit for forum non conveniens if the defendant shows 
there is an alternative forum that is both available and adequate and, upon a weighing of 
public and private interests, the strongly preferred location for the litigation.” (emphasis 
added)).  The Court has modified this standard when the movant is seeking to enforce a valid 
forum-selection clause, but some concerns remain. See infra Part III.B. 
 34. See Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing 
California’s refusal to enforce forum-selection clauses that limit a resident’s ability to pursue 
state-law consumer protection claims); Polzin v. Appleway Equip. Leasing, Inc., 191 P.3d 
476, 481 (Mont. 2008) (“[F]orum selection clauses are ‘prima facia [sic] valid’ and will be 
enforced unless the resisting party can show that the clause is unreasonable under the 
circumstances.” (quoting Milanovich v. Schnibben, 160 P.3d 562, 564 (Mont. 2007))). 
 35. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (noting the importance of “the twin 
aims of the Erie rule:  discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable 
administration of the laws”). 
 36. See, e.g., Rivera v. Centro Medico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009); 
Brief of Professor Stephen E. Sachs As Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 12–15, 
Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court (U.S. Dec. 3, 2013) (No. 12-929) [hereinafter 
Brief of Sachs]. 
 37. See, e.g., Westerberg v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. 94-16630, 1996 WL 43512, at 
*1 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 1996) (applying substantive state contract law in affirming a Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal); Impossible Elec. Techniques, Inc. v. Wackenhut Protective Sys., Inc., 
610 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying substantive state contract law and reversing a Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal). 
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dispute as to any material fact” that the forum-selection clause is valid and 
should be enforced, then the defendant would be entitled to summary 
judgment.38  This approach is superior for four reasons.  First, it 
circumvents the complicated statutory interpretation issues raised by the 
venue transfer approach.  Second, it avoids the potential Erie problems of 
the forum non conveniens approach.39  Third, it throws into sharp relief the 
important distinction between the validity and the enforceability of forum-
selection clauses.  Finally, it is superior to those solutions that propose 
statutory reform or the promulgation of a new Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure,40 because it does not depend on legislative action. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES AND THE SUPREME 
COURT’S FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
This Part begins with a discussion of the importance of forum-selection 
clauses to contracting parties including their economic and contractual 
significance:  forum clauses are either part of the parties’ bargained-for 
exchange (in the case of sophisticated parties) or they more generally 
reduce transaction costs and produce savings that are then passed on to 
consumers (in the case of form contracts with little or no bargaining).  Part 
I.B.1, Part I.B.2, and Part I.B.3 give a detailed account of three Supreme 
Court cases, The Bremen, Stewart, and Carnival Cruise, whose subsequent 
interpretation by lower federal courts led to disarray in forum-selection 
clause enforcement.  This disarray includes numerous circuit splits.41  Part 
I.B.4 concludes with an examination of the Supreme Court’s recent holding 
in Atlantic Marine, where the Court resolved some, but not all, of the 
disagreements concerning the enforcement of forum-selection clauses. 
A.  The Importance of Forum-Selection Clauses to  
Contracting Parties 
Forum-selection clauses have numerous benefits in complex national or 
transnational transactions.  Such transactions are by their very nature 
“fraught with legal risks,” including the “unwelcome possibility of 
litigation in a foreign court applying unfamiliar rules.”42  The economic 
disruptions caused by having to litigate in an unfamiliar court system can be 
substantial—they include:  significant travel expenses, communication and 
language barriers, and lack of familiarity with laws governing the 
jurisdiction.43  Forum-selection clauses can diminish the costs of these 
risks, and the resultant savings are presumably passed on to the contracting 
 
 38. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also cases cited supra note 37 (applying Rule 12(b)(6)). 
 39. See infra Part III.C. 
 40. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 9, at 93–111 (proposing a federal statute); Lee, supra 
note 13, 690–95 (same); Wright, supra note 22, at 1651–54 (advocating promulgation of a 
new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure). 
 41. See Wright, supra note 22, at 1635–42. 
 42. Friedrich K. Juenger, Supreme Court Validation of Forum-Selection Clauses, 
19 WAYNE L. REV. 49, 50 (1972). 
 43. Id. 
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parties.44  Courts and commentators have noted, “The right to litigate in one 
forum or another has an economic value that parties can estimate with 
reasonable accuracy,”45 and it is arguably superior for the parties to allocate 
the costs associated with that right via contract.46  As a result, forum-
selection clauses can be an important part of the contracting parties’ 
bargaining process.47  Beyond the context of international business, the 
savings gained from forum-selection clauses is recognized by those 
engaged in all types of business.48  Forum-selection clauses have permeated 
American commercial activity to such an extent that even many of today’s 
form contracts designate the appropriate forum to litigate disputes.49 
The scope of a forum-selection clause, is, in a sense, constrained only by 
the imagination of the drafter.50  But, broadly classified, a forum-selection 
clause can be one of two types.51  Either it is merely “an agreement to 
litigate in the agreed forum or fora,” or it is “an agreement to litigate only in 
a forum or fora.”52  The former is called a “permissive” or “nonexclusive” 
forum clause, while the latter is called a “mandatory” or “exclusive” forum 
clause.53  In determining whether a forum clause is mandatory or 
permissive, the “inquiry is one of . . . interpretation” according to basic 
principles of contract law.54 
 
 44. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991) (“[I]t stands to 
reason that [consumers entering into contracts] containing a forum clause . . . benefit in the 
form of reduced [prices] reflecting the savings that [a merchant] enjoys by limiting the fora 
in which it may be sued.”). 
 45. Borchers, supra note 9, at 57 (citing Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 
378 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.)). 
 46. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 594. But see Goldman, supra note 15, at 701 (noting 
that the Supreme Court “implicitly, if not explicitly, based its decision [in Carnival Cruise] 
on principles of economic efficiency,” but arguing that economic analysis cannot support its 
result or reasoning). 
 47. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 14 (1972) (noting, in the context 
of an admiralty towing agreement, that “it would be unrealistic to think that the parties did 
not conduct their negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with the consequences 
of the forum clause figuring prominently in their calculations”). 
 48. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 587–88 (examining a forum-selection clause 
on a boat cruise ticket); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(interpreting a forum-selection clause in an internet service provider customer agreement); 
Jason A. Lien, Forum-Selection Clauses in Construction Agreements:  Strategic 
Considerations in Light of the Supreme Court’s Pending Review of Atlantic Marine, 
CONSTRUCTION LAW., Fall 2002, at 27, 27 (“Most standard construction contract forms 
require that any disputes be venued where the project is located.”). 
 49. See sources cited supra note 48. 
 50. See Borchers, supra note 9, at 56–57; cf. Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 
U.S. 311, 316 (1964) (“[P]arties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the 
jurisdiction of [any] given court.”). 
 51. Borchers, supra note 9, at 56–57. 
 52. Id. at 56 n.1. 
 53. Id.; see also Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 383 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 54. Phillips, 494 F.3d at 386.  It should be noted that whether a forum clause should be 
interpreted according to federal or state law is an open question. See Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. 
Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 374 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (“[I]t can be argued that as the rest 
of the contract in which a forum selection clause is found will be interpreted under the 
principles of interpretation followed by the state whose law governs the contract, so should 
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While not always the case, presently at the state level, forum-selection 
clauses are broadly enforced.55  As to the procedural mechanism for 
enforcement, the most popular appears to be dismissal,56 although other 
methods are used as well.57  There is overlap between the standards 
employed for determining the validity and the enforceability of forum 
clauses in state and federal court.58  This overlap is largely due to state 
court adoption of the U.S. Supreme Court’s forum-selection clause 
jurisprudence since the early 1970s.59  Still, the standards are far from 
entirely coextensive.60 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Forum-Selection Clause Jurisprudence 
Historically, American courts, both state and federal, were nearly 
unanimous in their refusal to enforce forum-selection clauses.61  The 
primary support for this categorical refusal was found in the (now rejected) 
“ouster doctrine.”62  Put simply, in the era of the ouster doctrine, courts 
refused to enforce forum-selection clauses because they were “‘contrary to 
public policy,’ or . . . their effect was to [impermissibly] ‘oust the 
jurisdiction’ of the court.”63  In other words, a court properly vested with 
jurisdiction could not be ousted by the acts of a private party.64  The ouster 
doctrine began to fall into disfavor in the mid-twentieth century and was 
finally explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in 1972 in The Bremen v. 
 
that clause be.”); cf. Volkswagenwerk, A. G. v. Klippan, GmbH, 611 P.2d 498, 503–04 
(Alaska 1980) (interpreting a forum clause according to both state and federal law). 
 55. See generally Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provision 
Limiting Place or Court in Which Action May Be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4TH 404 (1984) 
(collecting cases from every state where forum-selection clauses were enforced).  But in 
limited circumstances enforcement of forum-selection clauses is deemed contrary to public 
policy. See id. § 3; see also Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Morris v. Towers Fin. Corp., 916 P.2d 678, 679 (Colo. App. 1996). 
 56. See, e.g., Vessels Oil & Gas Co. v. Coastal Refin. & Mktg., Inc., 764 P.2d 391, 392 
(Colo. 1988); Elia Corp. v. Paul N. Howard Co., 391 A.2d 214, 215 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978); 
Am. Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423, 424–25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Digital 
Enters., Inc. v. Arch Telecom, Inc., 658 So. 2d 20, 20–21 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Koob v. IDS 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 629 N.Y.S.2d 426, 434 (App. Div. 1995); Barnett v. Network Solutions, 
Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 204–05 (Tex. App. 2001). 
 57. Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 551 P.2d 1206, 1209–10 (Cal. 
1976) (affirming a stay of action pending resolution of case in jurisdiction designated by 
forum clause). 
 58. See generally Dougherty, supra note 55, § 4. 
 59. See generally id. § 4[a] (“[C]ourts in [nearly all states] have adopted the view that 
contractual provisions limiting the place or court in which a future action may be brought are 
not invalid per se, and that such provisions may be enforceable if, upon consideration of the 
facts of each case, they are ascertained to be reasonable.”). 
 60. See id. 
 61. Borchers, supra note 9, at 56–57; Mullenix, supra note 14, at 307–10; see also The 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (“Forum-selection clauses have 
historically not been favored by American courts.”). 
 62. Borchers, supra note 9, at 60. 
 63. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9.  See Juenger, supra note 42, at 51–54, for a discussion of 
the ouster doctrine. 
 64. See Juenger, supra note 42, at 51. 
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Zapata Off-Shore Co.,65 which forms the foundation of the federal courts’ 
understanding of forum-selection clauses. 
1.  The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 
The Bremen was an admiralty case.66  In that case, plaintiff Zapata, a 
corporation based in Houston, Texas, contracted with defendant 
Unterweser, a German corporation and owner of the tug boat “Bremen,” to 
tow Zapata’s oil rig from Louisiana to Ravenna, Italy, where Zapata 
planned to drill wells.67  The contract contained the following forum-
selection clause:  “Any dispute arising must be treated before the London 
Court of Justice.”68  The oil rig’s journey from Louisiana to Italy was cut 
short when severe weather conditions in the Gulf of Mexico caused 
substantial damage to the rig and Zapata instructed the Bremen to tow the 
damaged rig to Tampa, Florida.69  Zapata brought suit in the Middle 
District of Florida against Unterweser in personam and the Bremen in rem 
seeking $3.5 million in damages.70  Unterweser invoked the contract’s 
forum-selection clause and moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, in 
apparent reliance on a theory of ouster, “or on forum non conveniens 
grounds.”71 
The district court refused to enforce the forum-selection clause and the 
then Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed.72  It found 
that the forum-selection clause was contrary to public policy73 and that 
“even if it took the view that choice-of-forum clauses were enforceable 
unless ‘unreasonable’ it was ‘doubtful’ that enforcement would be proper 
. . . because England was ‘seriously inconvenient’ for trial of the action.”74  
This holding directly contradicted the intent of the parties in entering into 
the forum-selection clause in the first place:  England was chosen by the 
parties because it was a neutral forum with significant admiralty expertise.75 
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the court of appeals had given 
“far too little weight and effect . . . to the forum clause.”76  In light of the 
policy pressures exerted by modern commercial realities and international 
trade,77 the Supreme Court held that forum-selection clauses are “prima 
 
 65. 407 U.S. 1. 
 66. Id. at 2. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 3. 
 70. Id. at 3–4. 
 71. Id. at 4. 
 72. Id. at 4–8. 
 73. Id. at 8. 
 74. Id. at 8 n.9. 
 75. See id. at 12 (“Plainly, the courts of England meet the standards of neutrality and 
long experience in admiralty litigation.”). 
 76. Id. at 8. 
 77. See id. at 9 (“The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be 
encouraged if . . . we insist . . . that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our 
courts.”); see also id. (“[I]n an era of expanding world trade and commerce, the absolute 
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facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the 
resisting party to be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.”78  Under this 
standard, a forum-selection clause must be enforced unless the resisting 
party can make a strong showing that enforcement would be unreasonable 
and unjust, or “that the clause [itself is] invalid” due to fraud.79  Likewise, a 
forum-selection clause will not be enforced if enforcement would be 
contrary to public policy, “whether declared by statute or by judicial 
decision.”80 
Basic contract law principles were at the foundation of the Court’s 
reasoning when it articulated this standard.81  The Court recognized that 
forum-selection clauses are frequently freely negotiated and bargained-for 
elements of the parties’ exchange82 and thus, like other contractual rights, 
should be enforced in all but the most exceptional circumstances.83  One 
such circumstance is when the substantive law of the jurisdiction where suit 
is brought forbids enforcement.84 
Yet, while the Court articulated a standard for determining whether or 
not a forum-selection clause is enforceable, it left open the question of what 
procedural mechanism should be employed to effectuate such 
enforcement.85  Furthermore, in the wake of The Bremen, it was unclear if 
the standard articulated by the Supreme Court was applicable only to 
“federal district courts sitting in admiralty,”86 or to all cases over which the 
federal courts had jurisdiction, including diversity actions.87  Nevertheless, 
for some time it was “rare that a federal court even question The Bremen’s 
applicability to domestic cases based in federal question or diversity 
 
aspects of the [ouster] doctrine . . . would be a heavy hand indeed on the future development 
of international commercial dealings by Americans.”). 
 78. Id. at 10. 
 79. Id. at 15. 
 80. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
 81. Indeed, The Bremen is replete with language deferential to private contracts and with 
the language of substantive contract law itself. See, e.g., id. at 11 (noting that enforcement of 
forum-selection clauses “accords with ancient concepts of freedom of contract”); id. at 12–
13 (“There are compelling reasons why a freely negotiated private international agreement, 
unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power . . . should be given 
full effect.”); id. at 9 (“[E]xpansion of American business and industry will hardly be 
encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist . . . that all disputes must be 
resolved under our laws and in our courts.” (emphasis added)). 
 82. Id. at 16; see JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 2 (6th ed. 
2009) (“[T]he economic core of [a] contract is an exchange between at least two 
parties . . . .”). 
 83. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 16–17. 
 84. Id. at 15 (“A contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if 
enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, 
whether declared by statute or by judicial decision.”). 
 85. See Borchers, supra note 9, at 68–69. 
 86. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10. 
 87. See Mullenix, supra note 14, at 313 (“[A]s a case based in admiralty jurisdiction, the 
Court could fashion a federal common law rule . . . .  [But w]hether the Supreme Court could 
speak more broadly to domestic federal cases is troublesome . . . .”). 
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jurisdiction,”88 at least until the next time the Supreme Court encountered 
forum clauses directly. 
2.  Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. 
The Court revisited forum-selection clauses over a decade later in 
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,89 a nearly unanimous, if flawed, 
decision.90  In Stewart, the Court confronted a straightforward forum-
selection dispute.91  There, petitioner Stewart, an Alabama corporation, 
entered into a distributorship contract with respondent Ricoh, a 
manufacturer of copier products.92  The contract contained a mandatory 
forum-selection clause which provided that “any appropriate state or federal 
district court located in . . . New York City . . . shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction” over any dispute arising under the contract.93  When relations 
between the parties went sour, Stewart filed an action, in contravention to 
the forum-selection clause, in the Northern District of Alabama.94  Relying 
on the forum clause, Ricoh moved to transfer or dismiss the case to the 
Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 
1406.95 
The district court refused to enforce the forum-selection clause, reasoning 
“that the transfer motion was controlled by Alabama law and that Alabama 
looks unfavorably upon contractual forum-selection clauses.”96  The district 
court, however, certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal, and the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “venue in a 
diversity case is manifestly within the province of federal law”97 and that 
the standards articulated in The Bremen mandated enforcement.98 
a.  The Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court essentially followed the lead of the Eleventh 
Circuit99 and addressed the enforcement of a forum-selection clause 
through a motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) as a matter of 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
 90. See Borchers, supra note 9, at 67 (“[T]he Court has been more forthcoming with 
questions than answers.”); Lee, supra note 13 at 671–73. 
 91. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 24 n.1. 
 94. Id. at 24. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1068 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), 
aff’d, 487 U.S. 22.  The Eleventh Circuit reheard the case en banc and essentially adopted 
the reasoning of the original panel. See id. (“As the panel stated[,] . . . ‘If venue were to be 
governed by the law of the state in which the forum court sat, the federal venue statute would 
be nugatory.’” (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643, 649 (11th Cir. 
1986))). 
 98. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 25. 
 99. See id. (“We now affirm under somewhat different reasoning.”). 
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statutory transfer-of-venue law.100  It framed the question as “whether to 
apply a federal statute such as [28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)] in a diversity 
action.”101  Rather than applying the Bremen standard to determine if the 
forum-selection clause was enforceable, the Court drew on its Rules 
Enabling Act jurisprudence, including Hanna v. Plumer102 and its progeny, 
and interpreted § 1404(a) to resolve the dispute between the parties.103  This 
allowed the Court to sidestep any possible Erie question because “when the 
federal law sought to be applied is a congressional statute, the first and 
chief question . . . is whether the statute is ‘sufficiently broad to control the 
issue before the Court.’”104 
Setting aside the holding in The Bremen that forum clauses are prima 
facie valid and should be enforced absent extraordinary circumstances, but 
not explicitly overruling it, the Court concluded that § 1404(a) controlled 
the respondent’s request to transfer venue pursuant to the forum-selection 
clause and that the clause was merely a factor to be considered in deciding 
whether or not to transfer.105  Importantly, the Court recognized in footnote 
 
 100. See generally id. at 24–25. 
 101. Id. at 26. 
 102. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 103. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 26 (citing Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5 
(1987); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 759 (1980)). 
 104. Id. (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 749–50). 
 105. Id. at 32 (“We hold that federal law, specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), governs the 
District Court’s decision whether to give effect to the parties’ forum-selection clause and 
transfer this case.”); see also id. at 29–30 (“The flexible and individualized analysis 
Congress prescribed in § 1404(a) thus encompasses consideration of the parties’ private 
expression of their venue preferences.”).  As currently worded, the “Change of venue” 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), provides, “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the 
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or 
division where it might have been brought or . . . to which all parties have consented.” 
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).  It applies when plaintiff has sued in a proper venue, but where 
“in the interest of justice,” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the case should have been tried in a different 
district or division. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 634 (1964).  Section 1404(a) was 
passed into law as part of the Judicial Code of 1948. See 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3841 (4th ed. 2013).  The overall 
purpose of § 1404(a) “is to prevent the waste ‘of time, energy, and money’ and ‘to protect 
litigants, witnesses, and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.’” Van 
Dusen, 376 U.S. at 616 (citing Cont’l Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26, 27 
(1960)).  While the judicial standard used to determine whether to grant a motion to transfer 
brought pursuant to § 1404(a) is similar to that used in evaluating a motion to dismiss based 
on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and though “the statute was drafted in accordance 
with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, . . . [§ 1404(a)] was intended to be a revision 
rather than a codification of the common law.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 
253 (1981). Compare Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255–61 (indicating that courts should 
balance the plaintiff’s choice of forum, adequacy of an alternative forum, private interest 
factors, and public interest factors in deciding to grant forum non conveniens dismissal), 
with Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 616 (holding that a district court may grant a motion pursuant to 
§ 1404 “if the transfer is warranted by the convenience of parties and witnesses and 
promotes the interests of justice”).  The inquiry under § 1404(a) is essentially a balancing 
test of public and private interest factors. Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 
(3d Cir. 1995).  These interest factors include, but are not limited to:  the plaintiff’s choice of 
forum, the defendant’s preferred forum, the relative physical and financial conditions of the 
parties as it relates to their ability to litigate in given fora, the availability of witnesses to 
appear at trial in given fora, where the claim arose, the location of physical evidence relevant 
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eight that “the District Court properly denied the motion to dismiss the case 
for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 because [Ricoh] apparently 
does business in the Northern District of Alabama,” making the district a 
proper venue as per § 1391(c).106  Arguably, the implication of this footnote 
is that the forum-selection clause at issue did not render venue improper in 
all but the designated forum, even though the clause, by its terms, was 
clearly exclusive.107 
b.  Justice Scalia’s Dissent 
Justice Antonin Scalia was alone in dissent.108  The gravamen of his 
objection was that the Court had answered the wrong question, or at the 
very least had answered the pertinent questions in the incorrect order.109  
He framed the question before the Court differently:  “[T]he initial question 
before us is whether the validity between the parties of a contractual forum-
selection clause falls within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).”110  He then 
objected to the court’s interpretation of § 1404(a) as “sufficiently broad to 
cause a direct collision with state law” and as determinate of the “validity 
between the parties of the forum-selection clause.”111  As a dissenter had 
noted in the Eleventh Circuit below, “The enforceability of contract 
provisions is typically an issue of substance which a federal court sitting in 
its diversity jurisdiction must decide according to state law.”112  Similarly, 
Justice Scalia pointed out that Congress enacted § 1404(a) “against the 
background that issues of contract, including a contract’s validity, are 
nearly always governed by state law.”113  He observed that when Congress 
 
to the claim (such as construction sites), court docket congestion (to insure speedy resolution 
of the action), public policies of the fora, and “familiarity of the trial judge with the 
applicable state law.” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879–80.  The key difference between the § 1404(a) 
transfer and forum non conveniens analyses is one of degree:  a district is permitted to grant 
a transfer motion pursuant to § 1404(a) “upon a lesser showing of inconvenience” than that 
required to grant a forum non conveniens dismissal. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 
32 (1955).  A district court’s discretion is thus broader in evaluating a § 1404(a) transfer 
motion than it is when evaluating a forum non conveniens motion. Norwood, 349 U.S. at 32. 
 106. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29 n.8 (“[V]enue [is] proper in [a] judicial district in which [a 
defendant] corporation is doing business.”).  Venue is defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1391.  “Except 
as otherwise provided by law,” § 1391 governs “the venue of all civil actions brought in the 
district courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).  As per § 1391, venue is properly 
laid in:  (1) any judicial district in which any defendant resides, provided that all defendants 
reside in the same state; (2) a judicial district where a “substantial part of the events or 
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the 
subject of the action” is located; or (3) if no judicial district satisfies (1) or (2), in any 
judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the 
instant action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 
 107. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 12-929, slip op. at 8 (U.S. Dec. 
3, 2013) (adopting this dictum). 
 108. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (emphasis added). 
 111. Id. at 34. 
 112. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643, 651 (11th Cir.) (Godbold, C.J., 
dissenting), aff’d en banc, 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1987), aff’d, 487 U.S. 22. 
 113. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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intended to preempt state contract law, it did so explicitly, as it had with the 
Federal Arbitration Act, which was passed just a year before the venue 
statute that included § 1404(a).114  Thus, application of a venue transfer 
statute to a question of contract validity was inapposite.115 
Furthermore, § 1404(a) did not speak to the enforceability issue, 
especially because the plain language of § 1404(a)116 looks to the present 
and the future, namely “what is likely to be just in the future, when the case 
is tried, in light of things as they now stand.”117  By requiring that lower 
courts now consider the parties’ stated forum preference in making the 
transfer determination, Scalia argued that the Court had introduced “a new 
retrospective element” of examining the relative position of the parties at 
the time they contracted.118  In light of the types of factors that courts 
typically analyze in making the discretionary venue-transfer decisions 
permitted by § 1404(a), consideration of a retrospective element is 
improper.119  Congress clearly did not contemplate § 1404(a) being used to 
determine contract validity when it passed the venue statute.120 
Finally, Justice Scalia noted that the framework established by the 
majority, whereby the forum clause is to be weighed against other factors in 
the transfer determination, further implicates the validity issue and raises an 
important question:  “what law governs whether the forum-selection clause 
is a valid or invalid allocation of any inconvenience between the 
parties?”121  This is because if the forum clause is invalid it should not be 
entitled any weight at all in the § 1404(a) transfer determination.122  Having 
interpreted § 1404(a) as “simply a venue provision that nowhere mentions 
contracts or agreements, much less the validity of certain contracts or 
agreements,” Justice Scalia concluded that there was no federal statute or 
rule of procedure that governed the validity of forum-selection clauses.123  
 
 114. Id. at 36.  He further noted that “[i]t is difficult to believe that state contract law was 
meant to be pre-empted by [§ 1404, which this Court has] said ‘should be regarded as a 
federal judicial housekeeping measure.’” Id. at 37 (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 
612, 636–37 (1964)). 
 115. See id. (“Section 1404(a) is simply a venue provision that nowhere mentions 
contracts or agreements, much less that the validity of certain contracts or agreements will be 
matters of federal law.”). 
 116. Id. at 34 (noting that § 1404(a) “vests the district courts with authority to transfer a 
civil action to another district ‘[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the 
interest of justice,’” and such “language looks to the present and the future,” but not the past 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982)) (alteration in original)). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 34–35. 
 119. See id. at 34 (noting that courts consider “the forum actually chosen by the plaintiff, 
the current convenience of the parties and witnesses, the current location of pertinent books 
and records, similar litigation pending elsewhere, current docket conditions, and familiarity 
of the potential courts with governing state law”). 
 120. See id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 37.  In addition, Justice Scalia argued that it was a fair to assume that 
“Congress is just as concerned as [the Supreme Court] ha[s] been to avoid significant 
differences between state and federal courts in adjudicating claims” because such an 
assumption comports with the “congressional plan underlying the creation of diversity . . . 
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Thus, the Court was faced with an Erie124 issue governed by the Rules of 
Decision Act rather than a question of the constitutional limits on 
Congress’s power to legislate in a given area.125  Justice Scalia argued that 
resolution of this issue demanded application of Hanna v. Plumer’s 
“relatively unguided Erie choice.”126  He reasoned that application of a 
federal judge-made rule for determining validity of a forum-selection clause 
(i.e., the Bremen standard) would violate the twin aims of Erie because it 
would encourage forum shopping between state and federal courts and lead 
to inequitable administration of state-created contract law.127 
3.  Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute 
The Court’s next forum-selection clause case was Carnival Cruise Lines, 
Inc. v. Shute.128  Carnival Cruise, like The Bremen, was an admiralty 
case.129  Unlike that earlier case, the parties in Carnival Cruise were not 
both commercial entities, but two ordinary consumers, the Shutes, and a 
large cruise ship operator, Carnival.130  The Shutes purchased a seven-day 
cruise aboard one of Carnival’s cruise ships, and while on board the vessel 
in international waters off the coast of Mexico, Eulalia Shute slipped on the 
deck and was injured.131  When the Shutes, residents of Washington State, 
brought suit against Carnival in the Western District of Washington, 
Carnival moved for summary judgment, arguing that the forum-selection 
 
jurisdiction” and therefore § 1404(a) should be construed to “avoid the significant . . . forum 
shopping that will inevitably” be encouraged by the majority’s interpretation. Id. at 37–38. 
 124. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 125. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Since no federal statute or Rule of 
Procedure governs the validity of a forum-selection clause, the remaining issue is whether 
federal courts may fashion a judge-made rule to govern the question.”). 
 126. Id. at 26 (majority opinion) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965)). 
 127. Id. at 38–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“With respect to forum-selection clauses, in a 
State with law unfavorable to validity, plaintiffs who seek to avoid the effect of a clause will 
be encouraged to sue in state court, and non-resident defendants will be encouraged to shop 
for more favorable law by removing to federal court [to get the benefit of the Bremen 
standard of enforceability.]”).  It should be noted that although he was resoundingly outvoted 
on the Supreme Court, some lower federal courts view Justice Scalia’s dissent favorably. See 
Licensed Practical Nurses, Technicians & Health Care Workers of N.Y., Inc. v. Ulysses 
Cruises, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Lynch, J.) (expressing “lingering 
doubt” that Second Circuit precedent following the majority in Stewart would prevail if it 
came before the Supreme Court, and noting that it “is strongly arguable that in a diversity 
case, the validity of [forum] clauses should be determined by state law, which generally 
governs substantive questions involving the making and enforcement of contracts”); see also 
Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 374 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (noting a 
“strong dissent by Justice Scalia . . . particularly [the argument regarding] the spur to forum 
shopping that is created when the choice of a federal court over a state court determines the 
validity of a forum selection clause”).  The academic response to Stewart has likewise been 
critical. See Mullenix, supra note 14, at 321, 334 (“The Court sheepishly evaded the [forum-
selection clause] issues” and instead “elected to frame and answer a subtly altered issue of its 
own choosing”); Blair, supra note 13, at 810–12; Lee, supra note 13, at 671–73; Wright, 
supra note 22, at 1636–39. 
 128. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 129. Id. at 587. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 588. 
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clause in the Shutes’ tickets required they bring their lawsuit in a court in 
Florida and that Carnival’s contacts with Washington were insufficient to 
subject it to personal jurisdiction there.132  The district court granted the 
summary judgment motion on personal jurisdiction grounds.133 
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that Carnival’s contacts with 
Washington were sufficient to sustain the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
by the district court, and to conclude that under the Bremen standard “the 
forum clause should not be enforced.”134  Key to the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning was evidence “suggest[ing] the sort of disparity in bargaining 
power that justifies setting aside the forum selection provision,” in contrast 
to the “complex commercial contract between two sophisticated parties” in 
The Bremen.135  Here, the contract was “presented to the purchaser on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis.”136  Even if the Shutes had notice of the forum-
selection clause, which was doubtful, the Ninth Circuit noted that there was 
“nothing in the record to suggest that the Shutes could have bargained over 
this language,” another important factor distinguishing The Bremen.137  
Finally, independent from the Shute’s lack of bargaining power, the court of 
appeals held that the clause was unenforceable on grounds that 
“enforcement . . . would operate to deprive [the Shutes] of their day in 
court” because they were incapable of litigating the dispute in Florida.138 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit on the forum clause 
issue.139  Finding that the Shutes had “essentially . . . conceded that they 
had notice of the forum-selection provision,” the Court held that the Ninth 
Circuit has “distorted somewhat” the holding in The Bremen “by ignoring 
the crucial business contexts in which the respective contracts were 
executed.”140  The majority noted that the fact that the forum provision was 
not bargained for was inapposite, because “[c]ommon sense dictates that a 
ticket of this kind will be a form contract the terms of which are not subject 
to negotiation, and that an individual purchasing the ticket will not have 
bargaining parity with the cruise line.”141  The majority reasoned that 
Carnival had a compelling economic interest in limiting the fora in which it 
could be sued and that the savings from the forum clause would, in part, be 
passed on to consumers like the Shutes.142 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 589. 
 135. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 388 (9th Cir. 1988), rev’d, 499 U.S. 
585. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 389. 
 138. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 589. 
 139. Id. at 590.  The Court found the forum-selection clause issue dispositive and did not 
address the parties’ personal jurisdiction arguments. See id. at 589 (“Because we find the 
forum-selection clause to be dispositive . . . we need not consider petitioner’s constitutional 
argument as to personal jurisdiction.”). 
 140. Id. at 593. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 593–94. 
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The Court also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the “serious 
inconvenience of the contractual forum” factor of the Bremen enforceability 
standard.143  According to the majority, that factor was articulated in the 
context of a hypothetical situation where two American parties designate a 
“remote alien forum” for resolution of a local dispute.144  The forum 
designated by the ticket here, Florida, was neither remote (Carnival was 
headquartered there) nor alien.145  While forum-selection agreements found 
in form contracts must withstand judicial scrutiny for “fundamental 
fairness,” the Court seemed to limit its review to rooting out “bad-faith” 
motives such as using a forum clause “as a means of discouraging cruise 
passengers from pursuing legitimate claims.”146 
At least one commentator has questioned “whether anything remains of 
the reasonableness rule announced in Bremen,” because “[t]he principles in 
Carnival Cruise . . . seem to validate [nearly] every agreement” in light of 
the fact that every large corporation risks being sued in multiple fora and 
that litigation cost savings resulting from forum clauses can always, in 
theory, be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices.147  
Moreover, Carnival Cruise did not answer the central question of which 
law applies to determine the validity and enforceability of forum selection 
agreements in diversity cases.148  Instead, lower courts were forced to 
develop their own patchwork of enforceability standards and mechanisms, 
creating a complex and multifaceted circuit split.149 
4.  Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court 
The Bremen, Stewart, and Carnival Cruise created massive disarray 
among lower courts regarding the enforcement of forum selection 
clauses.150  First, courts disagreed as to whether to apply state or federal 
law in determining the validity and enforceability of forum clauses.151  
Moreover, even under federal law, uncertainty ran rampant because courts 
employed a litany of procedural mechanics to enforce forum clauses, 
including § 1404(a), § 1406(a), Rule 12(b)(3), Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 12(c), 
Rule 56, and the federal common law doctrine of forum non conveniens.152  
The split between courts that used § 1404(a) as opposed to § 1406(a) and 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) to enforce forum-selection clauses 
 
 143. Id. at 594 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17 (1972)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 595. 
 147. Borchers, supra note 9, at 74; see Goldman, supra note 15, at 701. 
 148. See Borchers, supra note 9, at 80–81. 
 149. See Holt, supra note 13, at 1918–28. 
 150. See generally Wright, supra note 22. 
 151. See Blair, supra note 13, at 810–12. 
 152. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (enforcing a 
forum-selection clause via summary judgment); Union Elec. Co. v. Energy Ins. Mut. Ltd., 
689 F.3d 968, 970–74 (8th Cir. 2012) (examining Rule 12(b)(3) and § 1406(a) as procedural 
devices to give effect to forum clauses); Wright, supra note 22, at 1639–42 (collecting 
cases). 
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became perhaps the most prominent (the Venue Split).153  This was because 
enforcement of a forum-selection clause under § 1404(a), as provided for in 
Stewart, is discretionary and requires that judges weigh a number of factors, 
some of which may prove more compelling than the parties’ agreed upon 
forum, in determining whether or not to enforce the clause and transfer the 
action.154  This stood in contrast to the judicial inquiry mandated by the 
application of § 1406(a), which allows for no judicial discretion at all:  if 
the forum clause renders venue “improper” in the district court where the 
action was filed, the case must be transferred or dismissed.155  This 
difference was not merely technical; it had real consequences for 
contracting parties, third-party litigants, attorneys, and the judiciary.156 
Recently, the Supreme Court squarely addressed the § 1404(a) versus 
§ 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3) split in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. 
U.S. District Court.157  This subsection first explores the underlying logic 
for each side of the Venue Split and then uses the history of the Atlantic 
Marine litigation to articulate what was at stake and why litigants would 
argue for the application of § 1404(a) versus § 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3).  
Finally, the section concludes by explaining the Supreme Court’s 
unanimous rejection of the § 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3) approaches in 
Atlantic Marine, and its clarification of the appropriate inquiry under 
§ 1404 when enforcing a forum-selection clause. 
a.  The Venue Split:  The Discretionary Venue Transfer Approach  
Versus the Improper Venue Approach 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Atlantic Marine, courts 
that enforced forum-selection clauses through venue transfer motions 
pursuant to § 1404(a) followed Stewart to the letter (the Discretionary 
Venue Transfer Approach).158  Key to their understanding was footnote 
eight of the majority opinion in Stewart:  “The parties do not dispute that 
the District Court properly denied the motion to dismiss the case for 
improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) because respondent apparently 
does business in the [forum].”159  Courts that adopted the Discretionary 
Venue Transfer Approach held that § 1404(a) governs only in the instance 
where venue is otherwise proper and recognized that “Stewart did not hold 
that § 1404 is always the proper approach when the parties have entered 
into a contractual forum-selection clause.”160  These courts observed that 
 
 153. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 12-929, slip op. at 4 (U.S. Dec. 
3, 2013). 
 154. See infra Part I.B.4.a. 
 155. See infra Part I.B.4.a. 
 156. See infra Part I.B.4.a. 
 157. No. 12-929, slip op. at 4. 
 158. See, e.g., In re Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 701 F.3d 736, 739–40 (5th Cir. 2012), rev’d 
sub nom. Atl. Marine, No. 12-929; Kerobo v. Sw. Clean Fuels, Corp., 285 F.3d 531, 538–39 
(6th Cir. 2002); Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879–83 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 159. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28 n.8 (1988). 
 160. In re Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 701 F.3d at 741. 
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“[a] forum-selection clause is properly enforced via § 1404(a) as long as 
venue is statutorily proper in the district where suit was originally filed and 
as long as the forum-selection clause elects an alternative federal forum.”161  
Thus, for courts following the Discretionary Venue Transfer Approach, 
whether venue was properly laid, as defined by statute, in the forum where 
plaintiff brought the action was a question precedent to choosing the proper 
procedural mechanism for the enforcement of the forum-selection clause.162  
Just because the forum-selection clause provided for venue in another 
federal district court did not guarantee that the clause would be enforced 
when applying § 1404(a).163 
Courts that enforced forum-selection clauses through § 1406(a) and Rule 
12(b)(3), however, held that an exclusive forum-selection clause rendered 
venue “wrong” or “improper” in any court other than that declared by the 
agreement (the Improper Venue Approach).164  Courts employing the 
Improper Venue Approach cited the general definition of venue as the 
“place of litigation” as grounds for their interpretation.165  The courts held 
that since parties to a contract that contains a forum clause have set the 
place of litigation by their contract, venue was rendered “wrong” or 
“improper” in any court other than that set by the terms of the forum 
clause.166  Under these circumstances, the judicial inquiry for forum clause 
enforceability was then exceedingly simple:  read the contract and dismiss 
or transfer if venue was “improper” or “wrong” according to the forum-
selection clause.167 
b.  The Supreme Court Settles the Venue Split 
The clash between the § 1404(a) approach on the one hand, and the 
§ 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3) approach on the other, was sharply illustrated 
by the litigation positions of the parties in the Atlantic Marine case.168  
 
 161. Id. (emphasis added). 
 162. See id. (“The choice between § 1404 and § 1406 depends on whether venue was 
statutorily proper under § 1391 in the forum where the action was initially filed.”); Id. at 748 
n.4 (Haynes, J., concurring) (arguing that the Venue Clarification Act of 2011 “demonstrates 
that Congress recognizes that forum-selection clauses may be enforced even where the 
chosen venue is not that chosen by federal venue statutes”); Jumara, 55 F.3d at 878. 
 163. See Union Elec. Co. v. Energy Ins. Mut. Ltd., 689 F.3d 968, 970–74 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 164. See id.  Section 1406(a) mandates dismissal or transfer of a “case laying venue in the 
wrong division or district.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2006).  The district court has discretion to 
choose between transfer and dismissal, in evaluating motions pursuant to § 1406(a). Id.  
Likewise, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) permits a defendant to bring a preanswer 
motion to dismiss for “improper venue.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3).  Neither the federal venue 
statute, nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure define “wrong” or “improper” venue. See 
generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391–1413; FED. R. CIV. P. 12. 
 165. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 12-929, slip op. at 5–6 (U.S. Dec. 3, 
2013). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Union Elec. Co., 689 F.3d at 970–74.  Indeed, the § 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3) 
inquiries are arguably made even more mechanistic in light of what little remains of the 
Bremen standard after Carnival Cruise. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 168. See generally In re Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 701 F.3d 736 (5th Cir. 2012) rev’d sub 
nom. Atl. Marine, No. 12-929. 
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There, Atlantic Marine and J-Crew Management, Inc. contracted for the 
performance of certain subcontractor duties at a large construction site in 
Texas.169  Their contractual agreement contained an exclusive forum-
selection clause providing that “disputes [between the parties] ‘shall be 
litigated in the Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, or the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk 
Division.’”170  The contract did not contain a choice-of-law provision.171 
Atlantic Marine failed to make required payments under the contract and 
J-Crew filed suit in the Austin Division of the Western District of Texas in 
violation of the forum clause.172  Seeking to enforce the forum clause, 
Atlantic Marine filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to § 1406(a) and Rule 
12(b)(3), arguing that the agreement rendered venue wrong and improper in 
the Western District of Texas.173  In the alternative, Atlantic Marine also 
moved pursuant to § 1404(a) to transfer to the Eastern District of 
Virginia.174 
Following Stewart, the District Court held that § 1404(a) was the proper 
procedural mechanism to enforce the forum clause.175  It rejected Atlantic 
Marine’s argument that the contract rendered venue “wrong” or “improper” 
in the Western District of Texas and refused to dismiss or transfer on those 
grounds.176  Instead, the district court balanced a number of factors in its 
§ 1404(a) analysis and found that, notwithstanding the forum clause, the 
location of the construction site in Texas and the location of third-party 
witnesses who would be unavailable for trial testimony in Virginia 
mandated denial of Atlantic Marine’s transfer request.177  The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed:  it also followed Stewart and adopted the Discretionary Venue 
Transfer Approach followed by a minority of circuit courts.178  It rejected 
Atlantic Marine’s § 1406(a) argument that the contract had rendered venue 
improper in Texas179 and noted in dictum that Rule 12(b)(3) governed when 
the “forum-selection clause designates an arbitral, foreign, or state court 
 
 169. In re Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 701 F.3d at 737. 
 170. Id. at 737–38. 
 171. Id. at 738. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id.  Notably, the district court also rejected J-Crew’s argument that it had 
“exercised its statutory right under [Texas law] to void the forum-selection clause when it 
filed [its] complaint in Texas federal court.” United States ex rel. J-Crew Mgmt., Inc. v. Atl. 
Marine Constr. Co., No. A-12-CV-228-LY, 2012 WL 8499879, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 
2012), mandamus denied sub nom. In re Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 701 F.3d 736, rev’d sub 
nom. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 12-929 (U.S. Dec. 3, 2013).  It found 
that the Texas statute did “not apply to the subcontract agreement between J-Crew and 
Atlantic” because the construction project was “contained entirely within the federal 
enclave” of Fort Hood. Id.  The significance of this choice-of-law argument is discussed 
below. See infra Parts II.A, III.A.1. 
 178. See In re Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 701 F.3d at 738–39. 
 179. Id. 
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forum . . . because dismissal is the only available option for the district 
court in those cases.”180 
The Fifth Circuit then affirmed the district court’s decision not to transfer 
and its § 1404(a) analysis in three steps.181  First, it found that the district 
court did not err in holding that the movant has the burden to prove transfer 
would be for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the 
interests of justice, even when the parties have entered into a forum-
selection agreement.182  Second, it found no error when the district court 
considered “the foreseeable inconvenience J-Crew would face if the case 
were transferred.”183  The Fifth Circuit held that “Stewart teaches that 
Congress has by § 1404(a) removed the lateral transfer of cases among 
federal courts from the control of private contracts.”184  Third, it was 
permissible for the district court to consider the “difficulties J-Crew would 
face in obtaining depositions from non-party witnesses” if the case were 
transferred.185 
The Supreme Court granted Atlantic Marine’s subsequent petition for 
writ of certiorari.186  J-Crew and Atlantic Marine argued substantially the 
same points before the Supreme Court as they had before the Fifth 
Circuit.187  An amicus, Professor Stephen E. Sachs, argued that the forum-
selection clause should be raised in a Rule 8 responsive pleading or under 
Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 12(c), or Rule 56 as an affirmative defense to suit—
similar to other contract defenses such as waiver, accord and satisfaction, 
estoppel, and the like.188 
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Samuel 
Alito, reversed.189  First, it sided with the minority of circuit courts of 
appeals in holding that a party may not enforce a forum-selection agreement 
under § 1406(a) or Rule 12(b)(3).190  The Supreme Court held that a 
statutorily proper venue cannot be rendered improper by the parties’ 
contractual agreement.191  It reached this interpretation of the venue statutes 
by relying on their plain language,192 their structure,193 and Supreme Court 
jurisprudence construing the same.194 
 
 180. Id. at 740 (dictum). 
 181. See id. at 741–43. 
 182. See id. at 741–42. 
 183. Id. at 742. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 743. 
 186. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 12-929, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Dec. 
3, 2013). 
 187. See generally id. 
 188. See generally Brief of Sachs, supra note 36 (making this argument). 
 189. Atl. Marine, No. 12-929, slip op. at 2. 
 190. Id. at 1–2. 
 191. Id. at 4 (“Section 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3) allow dismissal only when venue is 
‘wrong’ or ‘improper.’  Whether venue is ‘wrong’ or ‘improper’ depends exclusively on 
whether the court in which the case is brought satisfies the requirements of federal venue 
laws, and those provisions say nothing about a forum-selection clause.” (emphasis added)). 
 192. See id. at 4–6. 
 193. See id. at 6 (“The structure of the federal venue provisions confirms that they alone 
define whether venue exists in a given forum. . . .  [P]etitioner’s approach would mean that 
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Notably, the Court pointed to footnote eight of Stewart to support its 
interpretation of the venue statute and observed that “[a] contrary view 
would all but drain Stewart of any significance” because under such a view 
Stewart’s “holding would be limited to the presumably rare case in which 
the defendant inexplicably fails to file a motion under § 1406(a) or Rule 
12(b)(3).”195  Instead, as the Fifth Circuit had ruled below, the Court held 
that the parties’ forum-selection agreement could be enforced via a motion 
to transfer pursuant to § 1404(a), at least where the agreement designated a 
federal court as an available forum.196  It reasoned that § 1404(a) is an 
appropriate mechanism for enforcement because, in contrast to § 1406(a) or 
Rule 12(b)(3), discretionary transfer does not depend on the initial forum 
being “wrong” or “improper.”197  In further support of its holding, the Court 
noted that § 1404(a) “permits transfer to any district where venue is also 
proper . . . or to any other district to which the parties have agreed by 
contract or stipulation.”198 
The Court’s agreement with the Fifth Circuit ended there.199  First, 
contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s Rule 12(b)(3) approach, the Supreme Court 
held that “the appropriate way to enforce a forum-selection clause pointing 
to a state or foreign forum is through the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens.”200  This is because forum non conveniens was codified in 
§ 1404(a), where Congress provided for transfer as an alternative to 
dismissal.201  Using forum non conveniens also creates a more uniform 
standard for enforcement than the Fifth Circuit’s Rule 12(b)(3) approach, 
“because both § 1404(a) and the forum non convenviens doctrine . . . entail 
the same balancing-of-interests standard.”202  The Court explicitly left open 
 
in some number of cases . . . venue would not lie in any federal district.  That would not 
comport with the statute’s design, which contemplates that venue will always exist in some 
federal court.” (emphasis added)). 
 194. Id. at 6–8; see also id. at 7 (“Under the construction of the venue laws we adopted in 
Van Dusen, a ‘wrong’ district is . . . a district other than ‘those districts in which Congress 
has provided by its venue statutes that the action ‘may be brought.’  [Since] the federal venue 
statutes establish that suit may be brought in a particular district, a contractual bar cannot 
render venue in that district ‘wrong.’” (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 618 
(1964))). 
 195. Id. at 8. 
 196. Id. at 8–9. 
 197. Id. at 9. 
 198. Id. (emphasis added). 
 199. See generally id. at 9–14. 
 200. Id. at 9–10. 
 201. See id. at 10 (“For the remaining set of cases calling for a nonfederal forum, 
§ 1404(a) has no application, but the residual doctrine of forum non conveniens ‘has 
continuing application in federal courts.’” (quoting Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l 
Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007))). 
 202. Id. at 10 (“[C]ourts should evaluate a forum-selection clause pointing to a nonfederal 
forum in the same way that they evaluate a forum-selection clause pointing to a federal 
forum.”).  As an aside, this directive seems to implicitly contradict how the Court previously 
characterized the forum non conveniens doctrine in Piper Aircraft where it noted that, 
“District courts [are] given more discretion to transfer under § 1404(a) than they had to 
dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 
253 (1981). 
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the prospect of using a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to enforce a forum clause, 
whereby a defendant would assert the forum clause as an affirmative 
defense to suit in any fora other than that designated by the parties’ 
agreement.203 
Second, the Fifth Circuit erred “in failing to make the adjustments 
required in a § 1404(a) analysis when the transfer motion is premised on a 
forum-selection clause.”204  With the caveat that its “analysis presuppose[d] 
a contractually valid forum-selection clause,”205 the Supreme Court 
clarified that, under a properly adjusted § 1404(a) analysis, a case should be 
transferred to the forum specified in the forum clause except “under 
extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties.”206  
This stood in contrast to “the typical case” where the trial court balances the 
convenience of the parties and public interests, but gives some deference to 
the plaintiff’s choice of forum.207  Instead, “when a plaintiff agrees by 
contract to bring suit only in a specified forum,” his “choice of forum 
merits no weight”208 and he bears the burden of establishing that transfer to 
the agreed upon forum is unwarranted.209  Furthermore, the Court clarified 
that since the parties have already allocated inconveniences privately via 
their forum agreement, “the private-interest factors . . . weigh entirely in 
favor of the preselected forum.”210  Thus, a district court may only consider 
arguments about public interests,211 and the plaintiff must show that public 
interest factors “overwhelmingly disfavor a transfer.”212  In so limiting the 
§ 1404(a) and forum non conveniens inquiries, the Court brought greater 
uniformity to the enforceability standards under those approaches and the 
Bremen standard213 used in admiralty cases and adopted by many states.214 
Finally, the Court limited Van Dusen v. Barrack.215  Underscoring the 
federal source of the enforcement determination under § 1404(a), it held 
that when a plaintiff files suit in violation of a valid forum-selection clause, 
“a § 1404(a) transfer of venue will not carry with it the original venue’s 
choice-of-law rules” as it usually would.216  In short, the Court declared that 
the “policies motivating [Van Dusen’s] exception to the Klaxon rule for 
 
 203. See Atl. Marine, No. 12-929, slip op. at 11. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 11 n.5. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 12; see also id. at 12 n.6 (“The Court must also give some weight to the 
plaintiffs’ choice of forum.” (citing Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1995))). 
 208. Atl. Marine, No. 12-929, slip op. at 13. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 14. 
 212. Id. at 16. 
 213. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 214. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
 215. 376 U.S. 612 (1964). 
 216. Atl. Marine, No. 12-929, slip op. at 14. 
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§ 1404(a) . . . do not support an extension to cases where a defendant’s 
motion is premised on enforcement of a valid forum-selection clause.”217 
II.  CHOICE OF LAW AND PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS FOR  
ENFORCEMENT OF FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES 
While Atlantic Marine resolved some of the circuit splits relating to 
enforcement of forum-selection clauses, at least two remain:  (1) the split 
between courts that apply state versus federal law to determine the validity 
of forum-selection clauses (the Choice of Law Split); and (2) the split 
between those circuits that employ § 1404(a) to enforce forum clauses and 
those that use Rule 12(b)(6) (the Procedure Split).  Part II.A looks at the 
Choice of Law Split.  The primary axis of dispute between circuits on either 
side of this split is that articulated by Justice Scalia’s dissent in Stewart:  
does federal law or state law govern the question of validity of forum-
selection clauses?218 
Part II.B examines the remaining split among federal courts as to the 
proper procedural mechanism for enforcement of forum clauses.  This split 
was somewhat simplified by the resolution of Atlantic Marine.  Those 
courts that followed Stewart literally and adopted § 1404(a) as a proper 
mechanism for enforcing forum-selection clauses have been vindicated, in 
part, by the holding in Atlantic Marine.219  These courts, however, will have 
to develop new decisional law implementing the new modified § 1404(a) 
and forum non conveniens inquiries.220  This section also examines courts 
that treat a forum clause as an affirmative defense to suit and enforce the 
clause through Rules 12(b)(6), 12(c), and 56 (the Affirmative Defense 
Approach).  These courts opt to sidestep the venue transfer analysis, and 
their choice of procedural mechanism appears to be animated by the choice-
of-law concerns Justice Scalia articulated in his Stewart dissent.221  This 
 
 217. Id. at 14–15.  The Klaxon rule holds that a federal court sitting in diversity is 
compelled by the Erie doctrine to apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits. 
See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941).  Van Dusen 
provided an exception to this rule, namely, that “where the defendants seek transfer, the 
transferee district court must be obligated to apply the state law that would have been 
applied if there had been no change of venue.” Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639. 
 218. A second axis arises when the contract containing the forum-selection clause also 
includes a choice of law clause.  Should a federal court sitting in diversity apply the law 
indicated in the contract, the law dictated by choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits 
as per Klaxon, or the federal standard articulated in The Bremen? See Mullenix, supra note 
14, at 348–49. 
 219. See, e.g., Kerobo v. Sw. Clean Fuels, Corp., 285 F.3d 531, 538–39 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(following Stewart and applying § 1404(a)); Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 
875, 880 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 220. See supra notes 204–14 and accompanying text. 
 221. It should be noted that many courts employ a patchwork of approaches, allowing the 
procedural mechanism chosen by the parties seeking enforcement to dictate the underlying 
analysis. See, e.g., TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 647 F.3d 472, 475 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“We have affirmed judgments that enforced forum selection clauses by dismissing cases for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), . . . for improper venue under Rule 
12(b)(3), . . . and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” (citations omitted)); Slater 
v. Energy Servs. Grp. Int’l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2011) (applying Rule 
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section surveys cases from various courts and mines the arguments made in 
Professor Sachs’s amicus brief in Atlantic Marine to explain the nuances of 
the Affirmative Defense Approach. 
A.  The Choice of Law Split:  Does Federal or State Law  
Govern the Validity of Forum-Selection Clauses? 
In spite of Justice Scalia’s strong dissent in Stewart and the choice-of-law 
arguments raised by J-Crew at the district court level in Atlantic Marine,222 
the Supreme Court has left open the question of whether state or federal law 
governs the validity of forum-selection clauses in diversity cases.223  Many 
courts, even in diversity cases, uncritically assume that since the 
enforcement of forum-selection clauses is sometimes governed by federal 
law,224 the validity must also be a question of federal law.225  Such a 
conclusion, however, is not compelled by Stewart or Atlantic Marine.226 
While many courts attempt to avoid the issue of deciding whether state or 
federal law should govern the validity and enforceability227 of forum-
 
12(b)(3) when the enforcing party is seeking dismissal, but § 1404(a) when the enforcing 
party seeks transfer).  Since each of these mechanisms is explored independently in the 
Procedure Split section or has been overruled by Atlantic Marine, courts that take a 
patchwork approach are not treated separately in this Note. 
 222. See supra note 177. 
 223. See Borchers, supra note 9, at 78 (“Stewart did not decide whether state or federal 
law applies if enforcement of a forum selection agreement is attempted by some method 
other than a transfer under section 1404.”). 
 224. See generally Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
 225. See Borchers, supra note 9, at 78–79; see also Alliance Health Grp., LLC v. 
Bridging Health Options, LLC, 553 F.3d 397, 399 (5th Cir. 2008) (“‘Federal law applies to 
determine the enforceability of forum selection clauses in both diversity and federal question 
cases.’” (quoting Braspetro Oil Servs. Co. v. Modec (USA), 240 F. App’x 612, 615 (5th Cir. 
2007))); Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 18–19 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that federal law 
applies). But see Licensed Practical Nurses, Technicians & Health Care Workers of N.Y., 
Inc. v. Ulysses Cruises, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Lynch, J.) (“[T]his 
court has a lingering doubt whether, if the issue came before the Supreme Court, the Jones 
decision [applying federal law] would prevail.”). 
 226. See, e.g., Instrumentation Assocs., Inc. v. Madsen Elecs. (Can.) Ltd., 859 F.2d 4, 7 
n.5 (3d Cir. 1988) (arguing that Stewart “leaves open the question of whether the holding in 
[The Bremen], applying federal judge-made law to the issue of a forum selection clause’s 
validity in admiralty cases, should be extended to diversity cases. . . .  ‘The construction of 
contracts is usually a matter of state, not federal, common law’” (quoting Gen. Eng’g Corp. 
v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 356 (1986))); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. 
Ables & Hall Builders, 582 F. Supp. 2d 605, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Chin, J.) (“I will apply 
New York law to determine the validity of the forum selection clause . . . .”); see also 
Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 386 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that “we cannot 
understand why the interpretation of a forum selection clause should be singled out for 
application of any law other than that chosen to govern the interpretation of the contract as a 
whole,” but applying federal law because neither party “objected to the district court’s 
citation to federal precedent in its interpretation of the clause”). 
 227. A brief clarification of terminology:  courts often use the terms “validity” and 
“enforceability” or “enforcement” of forum-selection clause interchangeably. See Stewart, 
487 U.S. at 38–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  There is, however, a meaningful difference 
between the terms. See id.; Michael Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International and 
Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 133, 136 n.8; Mullenix, supra note 
14, at 293 n.2; cf. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (“The correct 
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selection clauses,228 there are frequent instances where such avoidance will 
not be possible.229  For example, many states have passed laws that limit or 
categorically prohibit forum-selection clauses in certain contexts.230  The 
choice of law issue emerges in stark relief in cases where, unlike Stewart, 
the party seeking to enforce the forum-selection clause (usually the 
defendant) resorts to a procedural mechanism other than § 1404(a).231  
Without the majority’s interpretation of § 1404(a) in Stewart to guide them, 
courts are largely in agreement that they are “require[d] . . . to make a 
‘relatively unguided Erie choice’” with regard to validity and 
 
approach would have been to enforce the forum clause specifically unless [the plaintiff] 
could clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause 
was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.” (emphasis added)).  This Note uses 
the term “validity” to describe the inquiry into whether a given forum-selection clause is 
effective and binding as a matter of substantive law and uses the term “enforceability” to 
describe the inquiry into whether a given forum-selection clause should be enforced.  In 
practical effect, there is some overlap between these concepts.  A forum-selection clause 
may be unenforceable because it is invalid as a matter of substantive law (i.e., because it was 
procured by fraud, etc.). See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.  Yet, a valid forum-selection 
clause is not always enforceable.  For example, under Atlantic Marine there could be a 
forum-selection clause that, while valid as a matter of substantive law, is nevertheless 
unenforceable because “public interest factors overwhelmingly disfavor a transfer.” Atl. 
Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 12-929, slip op. at 16 (U.S. Dec. 3, 2013); cf. 
The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.  For a discussion of the impact of conflating these concepts, see 
infra Part III.A. 
 228. IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Bros. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 437 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 
2006) (Posner, J.) (“It seems that either position is arbitrary.  If federal law governs, an 
arbitrary difference between a federal and a state litigation is created.  If state law governs, 
an arbitrary difference between a dismissal (followed by a refiling) and a transfer is created.  
Prudence in this situation counsels us to reserve decision and instead consider how the 
appeal would be decided under either view and hope that the result will be the same.”). 
 229. See V. Frederic Lyon & Douglas W. Ackerman, Controlling Disputes by Controlling 
the Forum:  Forum Selection Clauses in Construction Contracts, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Fall 
2002, at 15, 18 (“[P]ractitioners in Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, and Texas and their 
corresponding federal circuits must be particularly careful because of the potential Erie 
problem that may arise.  If the forum selection clause is deemed substantive, the state law of 
Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, and Texas will apply and the clause will be void; however, 
if the forum selection clause is deemed procedural, federal law will apply and the clause 
generally will be enforceable.  Federal courts addressing this issue generally have tried to 
avoid this vexing problem.”). 
 230. See Lien, supra note 48, at 30 (“[A]t least 24 states have enacted” statutes that 
“prohibit . . . enforcement [of forum clauses] in certain industries, including the construction 
industry.”). 
 231. See Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Sarasota Kennel Club, Inc., 489 F.3d 303, 306 (6th Cir. 
2007) (“When deciding to apply federal or state law to a forum selection clause, the context 
in which the clause is asserted can be determinative.  For example, when a party moves to 
transfer a case on the basis of a forum selection clause, the federal statute governing transfer 
motions controls the clause’s interpretation.” (citing Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29–30)); Blair, 
supra note 13, at 815 (suggesting that a court may or may not enforce a forum-selection 
clause “depending on which procedural motion the defendant chooses”); Wright, supra note 
22, at 1916 (noting that “whether [the defendant] would be successful in moving litigation 
[pursuant to the forum-selection clause] would turn on the procedural device it employed to 
enforce the clause,” because if the defendant “files a motion to dismiss, the district court . . . 
would likely apply state [as opposed to federal] law in its determination as to dismissal”). 
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enforceability.232  In making this choice, courts also seem to agree that they 
“should strive for uniformity of outcomes between federal and state 
courts,”233 and that “when deciding what is procedural and what is 
substantive . . . [they must] apply a functional test based on the ‘twin aims 
of the Erie rule:  discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of 
inequitable administration of the laws.’”234 
What, then, explains the split between courts that apply federal law and 
those that apply state law?  The disagreement is rooted in two distinct 
qualities of forum-selection clauses:  (1) they are agreements relating to the 
forum for adjudication which may or may not be enforceable;235 and (2) 
they are contractual agreements which may or may not be valid.236  Courts 
that dwell on the first quality reason that forum-selection clauses are simply 
venue agreements, i.e., they indicate the parties’ agreed-upon venue for 
adjudication of their disputes.237  Then, eliding the distinction between 
validity and enforceability, these courts assert that, since venue is 
manifestly a question of federal procedural law, enforcement and validity of 
such clauses is a question also governed by federal law.238  Thus, the 
Bremen standard as modified by Carnival Cruise determines whether a 
 
 232. Preferred Capital, 489 F.3d at 308 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 
(1965)); see also Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(“[O]ur decision must be guided by ‘the twin aims of the Erie rule . . . .’” (quoting Hanna, 
380 U.S. at 468)). 
 233. Preferred Capital, 489 F.3d at 308 (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 
U.S. 487, 496 (1941)); see also Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 513. 
 234. Preferred Capital, 489 F.3d at 306 (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471); Manetti-
Farrow, 858 F.2d at 513 (same). 
 235. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1067–68 (11th Cir. 1987), aff’d en 
banc, 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1987), aff’d, 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (applying federal law to 
determine “whether these two parties may choose the courts of Manhattan as the appropriate 
venue to try the controversy arising from this contract” because “venue in a diversity case is 
manifestly within the province of federal law”). 
 236. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]ssues of contract, including a 
contract’s validity, are nearly always governed by state law.”). 
 237. See Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 513 (“We conclude that the federal procedural 
issues [of venue] raised by forum selection clauses significantly outweigh the state interests, 
and the federal rule announced in The Bremen controls enforcement of forum clauses in 
diversity cases.  Moreover, because enforcement of a forum clause necessarily entails 
interpretation of the clause before it can be enforced, federal law also applies to 
interpretation of forum clauses.” (citation omitted)); Stewart, 810 F.2d at 1067–68 (“Our 
decision as to the choice of forum clause boils down to whether these two parties may 
choose . . . the appropriate venue to try the controversy arising from this contract. . . .  [W]e 
hold that venue in a diversity case is manifestly within the province of federal law. . . . 
[F]ederal law . . . must be applied to determine the effect of forum selection clauses. . . .  
Venue is a matter of federal procedure . . . .”); see also Gruson, supra note 227, at 158 
(“Characterization of the issue as one of ‘venue’ . . . probably has influenced the decision of 
some courts to apply federal rather than state law . . . .”). 
 238. See Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 513; Stewart, 810 F.2d at 1068–69; Brahma Grp., 
Inc. v. Benham Constructors, LLC, No. 2:08-CV-970TS, 2009 WL 1065419, at *3–4 (D. 
Utah Apr. 20, 2009) (applying federal law and enforcing a forum-selection clause in spite of 
a Utah statute that made the forum clause void and unenforceable); see also Martinez v. 
Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 222 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that courts also have a “tendency to 
blur the distinction between enforceability and interpretation”). 
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clause is valid and enforceable and Stewart determines whether the clause 
will be enforced when it is raised in the context of § 1404(a).239 
Courts that dwell on the second quality, i.e., the fact that forum clauses 
are contractual provisions whose validity is determined by substantive law, 
recognize that the “construction of contracts is usually a matter of state, not 
federal, common law,” and that the “policies behind Erie [demonstrate an 
absence of] a federal interest that displaces the state’s interest in 
formulating its own laws.”240  Under this interpretation, the validity of 
forum-selection clauses is a question of state law.241  Accordingly, these 
courts look to the states’ substantive contract law to make the validity 
determination.242  Thus, while the difference in the application of state or 
federal law to the validity question is often immaterial,243 it can lead to 
vastly inconsistent results where, for example, state statutes make forum 
clauses voidable or where the state’s common law validity standard 
deviates materially from The Bremen.244 
B.  The Procedural Split 
While the Procedural Split was at one time extraordinarily complicated 
and multifaceted,245 it has been simplified by the Court’s holding in 
Atlantic Marine.  Section 1404(a) and the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
are now firmly established as appropriate procedural mechanisms for 
enforcement of forum-selection clauses.246  But the Court has explicitly left 
open the possibility that using Rule 12(b)(6), and other means of raising 
forum clauses as an affirmative defense, may be “ultimately correct.”247  
Since the Court’s § 1404(a) approach, as modified when enforcing a valid 
forum-selection clause (the Atlantic Marine Approach), has been explored 
 
 239. See IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Bros. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 437 F.3d 606, 609–10 
(7th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Questions of venue and 
the enforcement of forum selection clauses are essentially procedural, rather than 
substantive, in nature. . . .  In short, we find nothing in Stewart or anywhere else that would 
compel us to reject the well established rule of this Circuit that Bremen applies with equal 
force in diversity cases.”). 
 240. Gen. Eng’g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 356–57 (3d Cir. 
1986); see also Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Sarasota Kennel Club, Inc., 489 F.3d 303, 308 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (“[State] law should apply to the interpretation of this forum selection clause.  To 
apply federal law would undercut both aims of the Erie test—it would encourage forum 
shopping by providing differing outcomes in federal and state court.”). 
 241. Preferred Capital, 489 F.3d at 308; Stewart, 810 F.2d at 1076–77 (Godbold, J., 
dissenting) (“The fallacy in characterizing the problem as ‘just a dispute over venue’ is that 
it leads [one] to conclude that because there is a federal venue statute the dispute is a 
procedural matter and therefore a federal matter. . . .  This case is not about what court is 
suitable.  It is about an agreement to choose between suitable courts.”). 
 242. Gen. Eng’g Corp., 783 F.2d at 356–57. 
 243. See IFC Credit Corp., 437 F.3d at 612–13. 
 244. Preferred Capital, 489 F.3d at 308; Gen. Eng’g Corp., 783 F.2d at 356–57. 
 245. See Holt, supra note 13, at 1918–28. 
 246. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 12-929, slip op. at 6–12 (U.S. 
Dec. 3, 2013). 
 247. Id. at 11 n.4. 
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in detail above,248 this section focuses on explaining the Affirmative 
Defense Approach, as employed by the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits and 
as articulated by Professor Sachs in his amicus brief submitted in Atlantic 
Marine.  It concludes by identifying the reasons why litigants might choose 
one procedure over the other. 
1.  The Affirmative Defense Approach 
Advocates of the Affirmative Defense Approach and courts that have 
adopted it extend the reasoning of Stewart’s footnote eight and recognize 
that “[t]o argue . . . that [a] forum selection clause . . . deprives [a] federal 
district court . . . of jurisdiction and venue is simply off the mark.”249  
Instead, they understand an exclusive forum-selection clause as a 
contractual agreement to resolve disputes in the designated forum to the 
exclusion of all others250 and is thus a type of contractual waiver.251  
Hence, if a party files a lawsuit in violation of its obligations under a forum-
selection agreement, the defendant can seek dismissal of the suit for “failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”252 pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) because the plaintiff has waived his right to maintain suit 
anywhere but the forum designated by the clause.253 
Under the logic of this interpretation, a defendant is not limited to Rule 
12(b)(6) for relief.254  If an exclusive forum-selection clause is a form of 
contractual waiver then it must be raised in the same manner as other 
affirmative defenses:  a defendant must include the forum-selection clause 
defense in its Rule 8 answer and may move to enforce the clause through a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) or even a 
motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56.255  In fact, there is 
support for the Affirmative Defense Approach in the Supreme Court’s 
forum-selection clause jurisprudence.  For example, the forum-selection 
 
 248. See supra notes 200–17 and accompanying text. 
 249. LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pac. Sewer Maint. Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1984); see also 
Silva v. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 387–88 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 250. Brief of Sachs, supra note 36, at 12 (“An exclusive forum-selection clause is . . . a 
contractual agreement that consents to litigation in a particular forum.”). 
 251. Id. (“The exclusive nature of the clause makes it a form of waiver, ‘the intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” (quoting Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 
1826, 1835 (2012)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 252. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 253. See Brief of Sachs, supra note 36, at 12–13; see also Westerberg v. Home Depot 
USA, Inc., No. CV-94-16630, 1996 WL 43512, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 1996) (applying 
substantive state contract law in affirming a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal). See generally 
Impossible Elec. Techniques, Inc. v. Wackenhut Protective Sys., Inc., 610 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 
1980) (applying substantive state contract law and reversing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal). 
 254. See Brief of Sachs, supra note 36, at 12–13. 
 255. Id. at 13–15; see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 588–89 
(1991) (enforcing a forum-selection clause through a motion for summary judgment); Silva 
v. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 388 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Accordingly, a motion 
to dismiss based on a forum-selection clause may be raised at any time in the proceedings 
before disposition on the merits.”); Kasper Global Collection & Brokers, Inc. v. Global 
Cabinets & Furniture Mfrs. Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 542, 567–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting the 
procedural split and enforcing a forum-selection clause via summary judgment). 
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clause in Carnival Cruise was raised on a motion for summary judgment, 
and the Court addressed the validity and enforcement of the clause without 
comment, suggesting that the procedural mechanism chosen by the 
defendant was appropriate.256 
2.  Implications of the Atlantic Marine  
and Affirmative Defense Approaches 
While recognizing that the Affirmative Defense Approach may be 
“ultimately correct,” the Supreme Court observed in Atlantic Marine that 
“defendants would have sensible reasons to invoke § 1404(a) or the forum 
non conveniens doctrine in addition to Rule 12(b)(6).”257  Perhaps the most 
obvious is that the Affirmative Defense Approach “may lead to a jury trial 
. . . if issues of material fact relating to the validity of the forum-selection 
clause arise.”258  In contrast, treating enforcement as a venue-transfer 
inquiry is purely judicial and does not require presentation to the 
factfinder.259  Thus, a defendant seeking swift enforcement of a forum-
selection clause would likely prefer relief under § 1404(a) transfer or the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens.260  Moreover, courts may also be more 
willing to enforce forum clauses via the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
and § 1404(a) because they are permitted to condition these dismissals and 
transfers on the defendant’s consent to jurisdiction in the alternative forum 
and waiver of certain affirmative defenses like the statute of limitations.261 
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, Rule 12(c) judgments on the pleadings, or Rule 
56 grants of summary judgment, however, also carry with them certain 
procedural advantages which may be compelling to defendants.  First, 
courts do not condition these dismissals on defendants’ waiver of statute-of-
limitations defenses and consent to jurisdiction.  Second, in diversity 
actions, such dismissals have res judicata effect to the extent a state court 
dismissal would.262  Finally, courts that follow the Affirmative Defense 
Approach do not engage in the balancing of public and private interests 
mandated by the § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens inquiries.263  Instead, 
 
 256. See Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 588–89; Brief of Sachs, supra note 36, at 2, 13–14. 
 257. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, slip op. at 11 n.4 (U.S. Dec. 3, 2013). 
 258. Id. 
 259. See id. 
 260. See id. 
 261. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 365 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(collecting cases and noting that “it is almost necessary to suppose . . . as in accordance with 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, that transfer under section 1404(a) may likewise be 
made where the defendant consents to going forward with the case in the transferee court” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1166 (2d Cir. 
1978) (affirming the district court’s grant of forum non conveniens dismissal on condition of 
consent to jurisdiction in Switzerland and adding “the condition that defendant must waive 
any statute of limitations defense that has arisen since the commencement of th[e] action”). 
See generally Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Validity and Propriety of Conditions Imposed 
upon Proceeding in a Foreign Forum by Federal Court Dismissing Action Under Forum 
Non Conveniens, 89 A.L.R. FED. 238 (1988) (collecting cases). 
 262. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 506–09 (2001). 
 263. See supra notes 249–56 and accompanying text. 
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their inquiry focuses primarily on the validity of the forum-selection clause 
as a matter of substantive law—if the clause is valid it will be enforced.264  
This could make enforcement more predictable, because plaintiffs would 
not have the opportunity to argue that “extraordinary circumstances 
unrelated to the convenience of the parties” mandate nonenforcement.265 
III.  ANALYZING ATLANTIC MARINE:  RESOLVING THE CHOICE OF LAW 
SPLIT, THE TROUBLE WITH FORUM NON CONVENIENS, AND WHY  
COURTS SHOULD ADOPT THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE APPROACH  
TO ENFORCE FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES 
This Part explores the implications of Atlantic Marine for the remaining 
choice-of-law and procedural circuit splits.  The choice-of-law circuit split 
as to validity of forum-selection clauses raises serious concerns about 
disuniformity of enforcement of forum-selection clauses in diversity 
cases.266  Likewise, the procedural circuit split leaves defendants with a 
number of confusing options for enforcing forum-selection clauses.267 
Part III.A argues that Atlantic Marine has implicitly provided a 
mechanism for resolution of the choice of law circuit split discussed supra 
in Part II.A.  It proposes that the judicial inquiry underlying enforcement of 
forum-selection clauses should proceed as a validity-enforceability two-
step.  Step one is to determine the validity of the forum-selection clause.  
Part III.A.1 argues that Atlantic Marine implies that validity should be 
determined according to state substantive law.  Step two is to decide 
whether to enforce the forum-selection clause, i.e., enforceability.  Part 
III.A.2 argues that Atlantic Marine has firmly established that enforceability 
of forum-selection clauses in diversity cases should be determined as a 
matter of federal procedural law.  Part III.A.3 discusses the application of 
the validity-enforcement two-step to a hypothetical partially based on the 
facts of Atlantic Marine. 
A.  Choice of Law and the Validity-Enforcement Two-Step 
Many courts conflate the questions of validity and enforceability of 
forum-selection clauses.268  This is unfortunate because such conflation is 
at least partly to blame for the existing choice-of-law split.269  To remedy 
this split, courts and litigants should treat the two concepts as distinct with 
 
 264. See Gen. Eng’g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 357–58 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (holding that the “interpretation of forum selection clauses in commercial 
contracts is not an area of law that ordinarily requires federal courts to create substantive 
law” and reversing the denial of a motion for summary judgment). 
 265. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 12-929, slip op. at 13 (U.S. Dec. 3, 
2013). 
 266. See supra notes 227–44 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra notes 256–62 and accompanying text. 
 268. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra notes 238–44 and accompanying text. 
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each worthy of its own legal analysis.270  In other words, the enforcement 
analysis should proceed in two steps. 
1.  Step One:  Validity 
Step one is to determine the validity of the forum-selection clause 
between the parties and its scope.271  Logically, the validity question should 
be addressed first, because if the forum-selection clause at issue is invalid 
then there is likely no reason to enforce it.272  Both Justice Scalia’s dissent 
in Stewart and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Atlantic Marine support this 
proposition.273  Indeed, the Court’s analysis in Atlantic Marine presupposed 
a valid forum-selection clause274:  if the forum clause in that case were 
invalid there would have been no reason for the Court to alter the typical 
§ 1404(a) analysis.275  Likewise, there would be no reason for a district 
court to engage in Atlantic Marine’s modified forum non conveniens 
analysis if the forum-selection clause is invalid.276  Atlantic Marine would 
not apply. 
Courts sitting in diversity should apply substantive state law in 
determining the answer to the validity question.277  The continued 
application of a federal common law standard to the validity question is 
improper.  The reasoning of those courts that apply federal law has been 
significantly undermined by Atlantic Marine generally and its narrow 
interpretation of federal venue laws particularly. 
First, as noted above, courts that apply federal law to the validity 
question conflate the concepts of validity and enforceability.278  The fact 
that the Supreme Court’s analysis in Atlantic Marine presupposes a valid 
 
 270. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 35 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (“The correct approach would 
have been to enforce the forum clause specifically unless Zapata could clearly show that 
enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such 
reasons as fraud or overreaching.” (emphasis added)). 
 271. See Cline v. Carnival Corp., 2014 WL 550738, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2014) 
(“[T]he Court must first determine whether the forum selection clause is valid and 
enforceable under applicable contract law, and assuming it is, the Court must next evaluate 
whether to enforce the clause under Atlantic Marine’s analytical framework.”). 
 272. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 273. See id. (“If [the clause] is invalid, i.e., should be voided, between the parties, it 
cannot be entitled to any weight in the § 1404(a) determination.”); see also Atl. Marine 
Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 12-929, slip op. at 11 (U.S. Dec. 3, 2013) (“When the 
parties have agreed to a valid forum-selection clause, a district court should ordinarily 
[enforce it.]” (emphasis added)). 
 274. Atl. Marine, No. 12-929, slip op. at 11 n.5 (“Our analysis presupposes a 
contractually valid forum-selection clause.” (emphasis added)). 
 275. See id. at 11–12 (“The presence of a valid forum-selection clause requires district 
courts to adjust their usual § 1404(a) analysis . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 276. See supra notes 200–12 and accompanying text. 
 277. See infra notes 279–98 and accompanying text; see also Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 
740 F.3d 211, 217–22 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 278. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
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forum-selection clause demonstrates that validity and enforceability are 
distinct concepts that demand separate legal inquiries.279 
Second, those courts that apply federal law to the validity question do so 
because they interpret forum-selection clauses to be matters of venue, 
which is “manifestly within the province of federal law.”280  This 
interpretation is not supported by Supreme Court precedent. 
In Stewart, the Supreme Court recognized that a forum-selection clause is 
partly an expression of the parties “venue preference” and held that the 
inquiry under § 1404(a) “encompasses consideration of the parties’ private 
expression of their venue preferences” where one party has moved to 
transfer.281  Its holding, however, was narrow:  § 1404(a) “governs the 
District Court’s decision whether to give effect to the parties’ forum-
selection clause” and transfer.282  In other words, § 1404(a) governs 
enforceability, not validity.283  Furthermore, § 1404(a) is a transfer statute 
writ large, which includes transfer to “any other district or division where it 
might have been brought,” i.e., a proper venue, “or to any district or 
division to which all parties have consented.”284  Thus, making an 
enforceability determination with regard to a forum-selection clause via 
§ 1404(a) transfer is manifestly within the province of federal law,285 but 
this is not the same thing as calling a forum-selection clause a venue matter 
and declaring that every aspect of that provision, including whether it is 
valid, is subject to federal law.286 
The Supreme Court confirmed this narrow interpretation of federal venue 
laws with respect to forum clauses in Atlantic Marine.287  There, it held that 
“forum,” the place of litigation, is a broader term than “venue,” a term of 
art.288  It followed that an interpretation of the venue statutes that “conflates 
 
 279. See Atl. Marine, No. 12-929, slip op. at 11 n.5; Martinez, 740 F.3d at 217–22; see 
also Bright v. Zimmer Spine, Inc., No. 14–CV–00095–WMA, 2014 WL 588051, at *2 (N.D. 
Ala. Feb. 14, 2014) (noting that in Atlantic Marine “the Court was meticulous in specifying 
that its holding was that a district court should transfer a case “[w]hen the parties have 
agreed to a valid forum-selection clause,’ . . . qualifying ‘forum-selection clause’ with the 
word ‘valid’ eleven times” and hypothesizing that “[i]f a court must determine that a forum-
selection clause is valid before the clause is enforced with a § 1404 transfer order, it follows 
that the court must look to state contract law to determine the validity of the clause before it 
applies § 1404” (first alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
 280. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1067–68 (11th Cir. 1987) (en 
banc), aff’d, 487 U.S. 22 (1988); see also supra notes 227, 237, 239 and accompanying text. 
 281. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29–30. 
 282. Id. at 33 (emphasis added). 
 283. See id.; supra note 227, 237 and accompanying text. 
 284. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006) (emphasis added); see also Atl. Marine, No. 12-929, slip 
op. at 11–16. 
 285. See supra notes 200–17 and accompanying text. 
 286. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1068–70 (11th Cir. 1987) (en 
banc), aff’d, 487 U.S. 22; see also Bright v. Zimmer Spine, Inc., No. 14-CV-00095-WMA, 
2014 WL 588051, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 14, 2014) (“In such a case, the state issue, [validity], 
is first and separate from the federal issue, and federal law could not be said to preempt 
applicable state law.”). 
 287. See supra notes 190–98 and accompanying text. 
 288. Atl. Marine, No. 12-929, slip op. at 5. 
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the special statutory term ‘venue’ and the word ‘forum’” is improper.289  
Hence, the Court’s unequivocal holding with respect to § 1391, § 1406, and 
Rule 12(b)(3):  those venue provisions do not implicate forum-selection 
clauses.290  In short, because these federal venue laws “say nothing about a 
forum-selection clause”291 and § 1404(a)’s application is limited to 
enforceability via transfer, federal law cannot be fairly construed to govern 
the validity of such clauses.292 
Without a broad interpretation of federal venue laws, district courts must 
engage in a complicated Erie analysis.293  As many have noted, the 
application of federal law to the validity question creates a host of messy 
Erie concerns.294  They have also noted that Erie points to the application 
of state law, as “nothing authorizes the federal courts to create federal 
common law contract principles to govern the essentially private 
contractual relationship between private citizens” in diversity cases.295  The 
Third, Sixth, and, arguably, the Second Circuit agree.296  Substantive state 
law should also govern the interpretation of the scope of a forum-selection 
clause—there is no compelling reason “why the interpretation of a forum 
selection clause should be singled out for application of any law other than 
that chosen to govern the interpretation of the contract as a whole.”297  
Justice Scalia agreed that Erie requires application of state law to the 
validity question.298 
Thus, the court should first look to substantive state law to determine if 
the forum-selection clause at issue is valid and interpret its scope. 
2.  Step Two:  Enforceability 
Step two is to determine whether the forum-selection clause should be 
enforced—the enforceability question.  If Stewart and Atlantic Marine 
stand for anything, it is the proposition that federal law governs the 
enforcement of valid forum-selection clauses—at least in the context of a 
motion to transfer pursuant to § 1404(a) or a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
 
 289. See id. at 5–8. 
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 291. See id. at 4–8. 
 292. See id.; supra notes 227, 237 and accompanying text. 
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the doctrine of forum non conveniens.299  Thus, in the context of a motion 
to enforce a forum-selection clause through a § 1404(a) transfer, the district 
court should engage in the modified inquiry dictated by Atlantic Marine.300  
That is, if step one determined that the forum-selection clause is valid as a 
matter of state law, then private-interest factors should be deemed to weigh 
entirely in favor of the requested transfer.301  Transfer will only be denied 
in extraordinary circumstances where public-interest factors unrelated to the 
convenience of the parties weigh heavily against a transfer.302  Furthermore, 
the party resisting the forum-selection clause will bear the burden of 
proving that enforcement is unwarranted.303  The same inquiry applies to a 
forum non conveniens dismissal motion seeking to enforce a forum-
selection clause which designates a state or foreign court system as the 
exclusive forum.304 
Under the Affirmative Defense Approach, the inquiry under step two is 
much simpler:  if step one has determined that the forum-selection clause is 
valid as a matter of state law, then the clause should be enforced in nearly 
all circumstances.  A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim or Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted 
unless the plaintiff has plausibly pleaded facts alleging a legally valid 
reason to avoid enforcement, for example, if the defendant waived its right 
to enforce or should be estopped from enforcing the otherwise valid clause 
on account of undue delay.305  The same can be said for a motion for 
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56—relief is appropriate unless the 
plaintiff can prove there are disputed issues of material fact as to whether 
enforcement is warranted as a matter of law.306 
3.  The Validity-Enforceability Two-Step Applied 
The validity-enforceability two-step will be easy for a court to apply.  A 
hypothetical loosely based on the Atlantic Marine case can be used to 
illustrate how the two-step should proceed.  Suppose a Virginia prime 
contractor enters into a subcontracting agreement with a Texas 
subcontractor for construction work to be performed on private property in 
Dallas, Texas.  The agreement contains no choice-of-law clause, but has a 
 
 299. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 12-929, slip op. at 8 (U.S. Dec. 3, 
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forum-selection clause that designates the federal or state courts sitting in 
Norfolk, Virginia, as the exclusive fora for litigation of any disputes 
between the parties.307  Section 272.001 of the Texas Business and 
Commerce Code, however, permits any person “obligated by the contract to 
perform the construction or repair” to void the forum-selection clause.308  
The subcontractor performs the work, but the prime contractor fails to make 
payments required by the contract.309  The subcontractor files suit in Texas 
state court and argues that he is exercising his right under Texas law to void 
the forum-selection clause.310  The contractor removes to federal court and, 
pursuant to § 1404(a), moves to enforce the forum-selection clause and 
transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia under Atlantic Marine.311 
Under step one of the validity-enforceability two-step, the district court 
in Dallas should first look to Texas state law to determine the validity of the 
forum-selection clause and its scope.312  Step one would lead the district 
court to section 272.001 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code and the 
court would have to decide if that statutory provision applied to the case at 
bar.313  It would have to determine if the contract at issue was “principally 
for the construction or repair of an improvement to real property” in the 
State of Texas.314  In the actual Atlantic Marine case, the district court 
decided that section 272.001 did not govern because the work was 
performed on Fort Hood, which was a federal enclave.315  In our 
hypothetical case, however, the construction work was performed on 
private property in Dallas.  Thus, assuming the contract was principally for 
the construction of an improvement to real property under Texas law, 
section 272.001 would govern and the scope of the forum-selection clause 
would be limited by the subcontractor’s right to void the clause.316  Our 
hypothetical plaintiff-subcontractor has exercised this right and voided the 
clause. 
Now the question becomes:  what weight should the voided forum-
selection clause be given in step two, the enforceability determination?  The 
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prime contractor is likely to argue that the clause should still weigh heavily 
in favor of a transfer to Virginia.  It was voided on a technicality of Texas 
law after all and still represents the parties’ “venue preferences.”317  The 
prime contractor is likely to point to Stewart where the Supreme Court 
found the forum-selection clause enforceable under § 1404(a) despite the 
policy of the Alabama court system of refusing to enforce forum-selection 
clauses.318  The subcontractor is likely to point to the Supreme Court’s 
disclaimer in Atlantic Marine that the section 1404(a) “analysis presupposes 
a contractually valid forum-selection clause”319 and Justice Scalia’s dissent 
in Stewart arguing that if the forum-selection clause “is invalid, i.e., should 
be voided, between the parties, it cannot be entitled to any weight in the 
§ 1404(a) determination.”320 
The subcontractor probably has the stronger argument, and is likely to 
prevail even if the district court gives the voided forum-selection clause 
some weight.  Atlantic Marine specifically conditioned its analysis on the 
presence of a valid forum-selection clause and reasoned that, “enforcement 
of valid forum-selection clauses, bargained for by the parties, protects their 
legitimate expectations and furthers vital interests of the justice system.”321  
Here, the forum-selection clause is not valid, but void,322 and given that it 
was voided pursuant to Texas statutory law governing construction 
contracts it cannot be said that enforcement would protect the legitimate 
expectations of the parties.323  The contractor’s expectation of enforcement 
is not legitimate where statutory law of the state where the work is 
performed gives the subcontractor the right to void and the contractor failed 
to bargain for a choice-of-law provision or arbitration clause in the contract. 
B.  Applying Federal Common Law Forum Non Conveniens Standards to 
Forum-Selection Clauses May Raise Concerns Under the Erie Doctrine 
Atlantic Marine holds that forum non conveniens is an appropriate 
mechanism for enforcement when a forum-selection clause designates the 
courts of a particular state or foreign country as the exclusive forum.324  
While the Court was likely trying to avoid having a different enforcement 
standard for forum clauses that designate a federal court versus those that 
designate a state or foreign court,325 application of forum non conveniens in 
this context is potentially problematic because it arguably violates the Erie 
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doctrine.326  This is because the doctrine of forum non conveniens is a 
federal common law principle and thus is not subject to the same Hanna 
analysis grounded in statutory interpretation as articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Stewart with respect to § 1404(a).327 
While Congress has, via § 1404(a), codified “the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens for the subset of cases in which the transferee forum is within 
the federal court system, [for the remaining cases] the residual doctrine of 
forum non conveniens ‘has continuing application in federal courts.’”328  
Yet, because it is a federal common law principle, its application to forum-
selection clauses must, arguably,329 satisfy the “twin aims of the Erie rule:  
discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable 
administration of the laws.”330  In light of the fact that many state courts 
have adopted the Bremen standard to determine both validity and 
enforceability of forum-selection clauses,331 the application of forum non 
conveniens in federal court actions could lead to inequitable administration 
of states’ substantive contract law and encourage forum shopping in the rare 
event that plaintiff prevails under Atlantic Marine’s modified analysis.332 
These concerns are valid, but likely overstated.  First, as noted by the 
Court in Atlantic Marine, Congress has expressed implicit approval of the 
forum non conveniens doctrine by codifying it at § 1404(a).333  Such 
approval provides support for the proposition that federal courts should 
have control over which litigants will have access to the courtroom and 
which will not.334  Thus, because the “[f]orum non conveniens doctrine 
concerns the administration and self-management of the federal courts, [it] 
does not implicate state-created substantive rules of decision.”335 
Moreover, after Atlantic Marine, it is not clear that the forum non 
conveniens inquiry as modified for enforcement of forum-selection clauses 
would deviate materially from most existing state law standards.  Before 
Atlantic Marine, it was unclear whether a federal court sitting in diversity 
was permitted more discretion by the forum non conveniens inquiry, which 
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required the court to consider balancing of public, private, and third-party 
interests, than the Bremen standard adopted by many states.336  
Additionally, “the presumption underlying any forum non conveniens 
determination is the fundamental respect accorded the plaintiff’s original 
choice in forum,” a presumption in no way shared with The Bremen.337  If a 
federal court considers these interests instead of the limited Bremen factors, 
then there could be a strong possibility of inequitable administration of the 
laws and corresponding forum shopping, and enforcement would be far less 
certain in federal court.338  However, the newly articulated § 1404(a) and 
forum non conveniens inquiry under Atlantic Marine brings enforcement 
via these mechanisms into greater uniformity with the Bremen standard 
adopted by many states.339  The presence of a valid forum-selection clause 
transforms the analysis because all private interests will weigh in favor of 
dismissal and only overwhelming public interests will prevent it.340  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has now declared in Atlantic Marine that 
the plaintiff’s original choice of forum merits no consideration at all when 
there is a valid forum-selection clause.341  This significantly decreases the 
risk of violating the twin aims of Erie, at least with respect to those states 
that have adopted the Bremen standard.  These concerns will remain, 
however, for situations where states have adopted limitations on the validity 
and enforceability of forum-selection clauses in certain contexts.342  In 
these situations, the forum non conveniens inquiry under Atlantic Marine is 
likely to produce wildly different outcomes, especially if the choice-of-law 
circuit split as to validity is not resolved in favor of applying state law.343 
C.  Raising the Forum-Selection Clause As an Affirmative Defense Is a 
Superior Procedural Mechanism for Enforcement 
In light of these Erie concerns and the strained interpretation of § 1404(a) 
in Stewart, the Supreme Court gave too little consideration in Atlantic 
Marine to the Affirmative Defense Approach followed by the First, Third, 
and Sixth Circuits and as articulated by Professor Sachs. 
In addition to the arguments raised by the circuit courts and Professor 
Sachs in his amicus brief before the Court in Atlantic Marine,344 enforcing 
a forum-selection clause via the Affirmative Defense Approach avoids the 
Erie concerns raised by enforcement using forum non conveniens.  This is 
because Rule 12 and Rule 56 are federal rules and are thus permissible 
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exercises of authority so long as they comport with the Rules Enabling 
Act.345  Evaluating the forum-selection clause as an affirmative defense 
under Rules 12 and 56 would require the court to examine substantive state 
contract law to determine whether the plaintiff had plausibly pleaded 
avoidance of the forum-selection clause346 or raised sufficient disputed 
issues of material fact to avoid the clause.347  As noted above, the 
Affirmative Defense Approach could also substantially avoid the 
enforceability determination required by § 1404(a) and forum non 
conveniens approaches under Atlantic Marine.348  It is also superior to those 
solutions that propose statutory reform or the promulgation of a new 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, because it does not depend on legislative 
action.349 
Finally, concerns that defendants will have to commit significant 
resources litigating in the noncontractual forum are overstated.  Defendants 
are permitted, indeed required, to bring a Rule 12(b)(6) motion before 
answering the complaint and the court may, pursuant to Rule 12(d), convert 
such a motion to one for summary judgment if it must consider matters 
outside the pleadings.350  Furthermore, even if a plaintiff’s defense to 
enforcement requires discovery, a court is permitted to favor jurisdictional 
discovery and thus can proceed with discovery related to the forum-
selection clause before that relating to the more substantive merits of the 
case at bar.351  After this discovery, the district court can conduct an 
evidentiary hearing and make relevant findings of fact.352  Finally, a 
defendant may be able to file a breach of contract action of its own and 
obtain damages, i.e., its litigation costs in the noncontractual forum.353 
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CONCLUSION 
Enforcement of forum-selection clauses in federal court has come a long 
way since the era of the ouster doctrine.  Federal courts now strongly 
recognize the ability of parties to contract for rights relating to the forum 
where they will litigate disputes.  The disuniformity of approaches to 
enforcement of such clauses in federal courts raises a threat that litigants 
will see different results in state and federal courts.  In Atlantic Marine, the 
Supreme Court explicitly put to rest some of the circuit splits regarding the 
proper procedural mechanisms for enforcement.  Furthermore, Atlantic 
Marine’s narrow reading of federal venue and transfer provisions provides 
implicit guidance to lower courts as to the question of whether federal or 
state law should govern the validity of forum-selection clauses—state law 
should apply. 
In adjudicating a motion to enforce a forum-selection clause, a district 
court should first address the question of the clause’s validity under state 
law.  Only after determining the clause’s validity should a district court 
engage in the enforceability inquiry dictated by Atlantic Marine with 
respect to § 1404(a) transfer and forum non conveniens dismissal. 
The Supreme Court has left open the question as to whether a forum-
selection clause may be raised as an affirmative defense and a defendant 
may then seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 12(c), and Rule 56.  
This approach is superior to other available methods.  It avoids the 
problematic Erie concerns of using forum non conveniens and promotes 
uniform enforcement of forum-selection clauses by ensuring that they are 
treated in the same manner courts treat other contractual rights. 
 
